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Whose Right Is It Anyway? Individualism,
Community, and the Right to Die: A
Commentary on the New Jersey
Experience
by
JOANNA K. WEINBERG*

The transformation of our culture and our society would have to happen at a number of levels. If it occurred only in the minds of individuals (as to some degree it already has) it would be powerless. If it came
only from the initiative of the state, it would be tyrannical. Personal
transformation among large numbers is essential, and it must not only
be a transformation of consciousness but must also involve individual
action. But individuals need the nurture of crops that carry a moral
tradition reinforcing their own aspirations ....
[These are] commitments that require a new social ecology... [and] a social movement
dedicated to the idea of such a transformation.
-from Habits of the Heart'

In recent years, there has been growing controversy over whether,
how, and when life-sustaining treatment may be withdrawn from a terminally ill person. While the debate has largely centered on defining the
limits of conscious life, it has also concerned the rights and obligations of
patients, doctors, and family 2 and the specific mechanisms or procedures
*
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1. R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER & S. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE
HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 286 (1985).
2. See, e.g., Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment, in I PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS (1982) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION REPORT]. Congress established the Commission in 1978 to study a wide range of
ethical issues in medical and scientific research and treatment. 42 U.S.C. § 300v (1982). See
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by which society chooses to make these decisions. Moreover, the rightto-die debate 3 has become the forum for an underlying conflict-between
a view of individuals as autonomous legal entities with personally-focused rights and as interdependent members of a community, sharing
common values. 4 It has also focused attention on the practical dimensions of competing doctrines about decision-makers, including the doctrines of self-determination and an individual's best interests.
Actors in many settings-judges, legislators, medical professionals,
and ethicists-have sought to develop a consistent approach to deciding
these issues. Yet, inevitably, everyone is affected. The shared experience
of actual or potential assaults on personal autonomy engenders recognition of "sameness" in our vulnerability. The debate requires our immediate, contextual, and subjective involvement. 5 It forces us to examine
deep-seated emotional and moral values. Well-publicized advances in
medical treatment and technology have further expanded the debate's
impact to universal dimensions.
also Weinberg, Aging and Dependence: Toward a Redefinition of Autonomy, 68 Soc.
CASEWORK 522, 523 (1987).

3. While I have termed the issue the "right-to-die," in fact that is something of a misnomer. The concept more accurately incorporates not only the right of a terminally ill person to
choose death as an alternative to continued treatment, but also the right of a family or a doctor
to decide to remove, withdraw, or not to initiate life-prolonging treatment. The legal and
medical communities have commented extensively on issues relating to removal or withdrawal
of treatment. See, e.g., BY No EXTRAORDINARY MEANS (J. Lynn ed. 1986); D. CALLAHAN,
SETTING LIMITS: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING SOCIETY (1987); G. GRISEZ & J. BOYLE,
LIFE AND DEATH WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE EUTHANASIA

DEBATE (1979); P. SKEGG, LAW, ETHICS, AND MEDICINE: STUDIES IN MEDICAL LAW
(1984); R. VEATCH, DEATH, DYING, AND EUTHANASIA (1977). Recently, a controversial
editorial provoked considerable debate when the author admitted allowing a terminally ill patient to die. "It's Over, Debbie," 259 J. A.M.A. 272 (1988). In addition, The Hastings Center,
an institution that conducts research on ethics and the life sciences, has published books and

monographs on this issue. See CASEBOOK ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING (C. Cohen ed. 1988); GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING (C.

Cohen ed.

1987); Annas, When Procedures Limit Rights: From Quinlan to Conroy, 15 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 24 (1985); Armstrong & Colen, From Quinlan to Jobes: The Courts and the
PVS Patient, 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 37 (1988); Jennings, Callahan & Caplan, Ethical
Challenges of Chronic Illness, 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP. Supp. 1, 5 (1988). The point was
stated poignantly in a recent Ohio case in which the judge commented: "Since man, in his
ingenuity has created a new state of human existence-minimal human life sustained by manmade life supports-he must now devise and fashion rules and parameters for that existence."
Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 6, 426 N.E.2d 809, 812 (1980).
4. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); J. HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION: AUTONOMY,
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).

5.

COMMUNITY,

BUREAUCRACY

(1986); J. RAWLS, A

See Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97

HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987).
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It is important to recognize the multifaceted dimensions of this debate. On one level, the discourse is about legal fights, most particularly,
the individual rights embedded in the Constitution. These include rights
relating to individual autonomy as well as those relating to procedural
fairness. Rights, however, present a narrowed focus, a presumption that
the ideology of rights contains the answer to complex social problems.
Rights discourse is not necessarily the most appropriate context for deciding certain issues. 6 Rights ideology does not respond to the multiple
interests that might be present, nor does it readily provide unconventional remedies. 7 In addition to the individual and the state, parties with
a cognizable interest also include children, spouses, other family members, and medical and social service professionals. A discourse that only
addresses the rights of some as against the duties of others loses sight of
the fact that people sometimes act for reasons other than the existence of

right or duty-out of reasons of morality, social values, or behavioral
norms. In addition, these issues have been considered in the context of
many different professional norms of behavior, in which the obligations
of both the state and of professionals often conflict. The debate has
brought the state and family interests as well as the competing legal and

medical ideologies into sharp focus.
The debate over the right to die has also exposed some hidden fears:
the fear of dying and, more broadly, of aging and losing one's personal
6. See Schneider, Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia, 76 CALIF. L. REv. 151,
152-53 (1988). See generally M. IGNATIEFF, THE NEEDS OF STRANGERS (1985); R. MORGAN,
DISABLING AMERICA: THE 'RIGHTS' INDUSTRY (1984). Schneider also suggests that rights
discourse on these issues is flawed because of the assumption that rights are monolithic and
individually-based. He suggests that in some instances, parent/child relationships, for example, at least two sets of rights might be involved-the parents' and the child's. Moreover, in
some instances courts have enforced rights in a way that seems communitarian. In Parham v.
J.R., 422 U.S. 584, 602 (1978), the Supreme Court found that the community's version of what
was in the child's best interests superceded any monolithic right to autonomy that the child
might have had. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972), the parental rights included
society's interest in community diversity, Le., pluralism. See also R. GOLDSTEIN, MOTHERLOVE AND ABORTION (1988) (discussing the interconnected relationship between mother and
child, and the difficulty of conceptually severing that bond in a rights-oriented analysis).
7. Carl Schneider points out that Americans think about rights in the context of what he
calls the "Mill paradigm," the state's regulation of an individual's activities. Schneider, supra
note 6, at 156. In that context there is a built-in presumption in favor of the individual. Id. at
157. Many conflicts, however, including the "right to die," are multi-polar rather than bipolar. Id at 157-59. At present, no satisfactory alternative exists to the "Mill paradigm,"
although innovative approaches in alternative dispute resolution forums and remedial alternatives have provided considerable groundwork. See generally E. ABEL, THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE (1982); D. SCHOENBROD, A. MACBETH, D. LEVINE & D. JUNG, REMEDIES:
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE (forthcoming West); Lempert, Grievances andLegitimacy: The Beginnings and End of Dispute Settlement, 15 LAW Soc'y REv. 707 (1981).
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autonomy. Until very recently, modern society has avoided confronting
these fears by leaving difficult decisions to physicians or other "trained
professionals." ' 8 The power to manipulate treatment of the terminally-ill,
however, has created issues that simply did not exist twenty or even ten
years ago. Advances in medical technology have brought these issues out
into the open and have made the decision-making processes accessible to
those most affected. Additionally, these technological changes have occurred at a time when social mores and legal rules have also changed.
Consequently, patients and families no longer choose to leave these crucial decisions to professionals alone. The public's desire to regain independence and self-determination in decision-making has been evidenced
in legislative and administrative proposals 9 and commentary within the
medical profession. I0 At the same time, ironically, the elderly or dis8. P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 140-41 (1982).
Starr describes the consolidation of professional authority in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century. He later points to the individual rights movement, particularly the advocates for women and the disabled, as successfully having undermined that authority during the
1970s. Id. at 388-89. See also LONG TERM CARE OF THE ELDERLY (C. Harrington, R. Newcomer & C. Estes eds. 1985); R. MACKLIN, MORTAL CHOICES: BIOETHICS IN TODAY'S
WORLD 99-112 (1987).
9. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has submitted a
proposed uniform act recognizing the enforceability of "living wills" in limited situations. Cf
The Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, Aug. 1985, reprinted in SOCIETY FOR THE
RIGHT TO DIE, HANDBOOK OF 1985 LIVING WILL LAWS 35-47 (1985). The model law was
the result of a project that the Society co-sponsored with the Yale Legislative Service in 1978,
to draft a model natural death act. The model act was based upon the California Natural
Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7187(f) et seq. (West Supp. 1987); see SOCIETY
FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 17-21 (1978). New Jersey is the only state
which established a health care commission instead of enacting a natural death act. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:9y 1-6 (West 1986) (establishing a permanent Commission on Legal and Ethical
Problems in Delivery of Health Care, which is to report to the legislature in December 1988
and every three years thereafter). To date, 35 states and the District of Columbia have enacted
"right-to-die" legislation. See In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 342 n.2, 529 A.2d 404, 407 n.2
(1987). See also Moral, Ethical and Legal Questions of ExtraordinaryHealth Care: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 31-32 (1975) (testimony of W. Gaglin, M.D.); Nursing Home Care in the U.S.: Failurein
Public Policy, IntroductoryReport to the Subcomm. on Long-Term Care of the Senate Comm.
on Aging, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16-18 (1974); Death with Dignity, Hearings Before the Special
Comm. on Aging, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1972); DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, TASK FORCE ON LONG TERM CARE HEALTH POLICIES, REPORT TO CONGRESS
AND THE SECRETARY (1987); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGY AND
AGING IN AMERICA (1985).

10. See, e.g., Avorn, Medicine, Health and the Geriatric Transformation, 115 DAEDALUS
211 (1986); Beecher, Ethical Problems Created by the Hopelessly Unconscious Patient, 278
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1425 (1968); Optimum Care for Hopelessly Ill Patients: Report of the
Clinical Care Committee of the Massachusetts General Hospital, 295 NEW ENG. J. MED. 362
(1976); Somers, Long-Term Carefor the Elderly and Disabled, 307 NEw ENG. J. MED. 221
(1982); Verbrugge, Longer Life But Worse Health? Trends in Health and Mortality of MiddleAged and Older Persons, 62 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 475 (1984).
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abled population-largely poor, frail, and alone-is expected to increase
dramatically by the end of this century. 1 Without a community or family structure to provide support, they are often unable to take advantage
of the structures that have been created to inform or assist them. Increasingly courts have been called upon to be the arbiters of these challenging decisions.
Difficult questions have become central to the debate. May everyone participate in choosing the course of his or her medical care, even if
that care consists of affirmative acts that hasten death? How is competence of an individual ascertained? If substitute decision-makers are permitted to make decisions for an individual, what are the appropriate
standards for making such decisions, and for choosing substitute decision-makers? In legal culture, these questions are framed as rights of
autonomous persons; in the socio-medical culture, they are the ethical
obligations of professional care providers.
The legal system's response to the dilemma of aging and loss of autonomy has undergone significant change and has reached an uneasy and
not altogether satisfactory resolution. Through an examination of one
court's decisions, this Commentary will explore decisions regarding advanced medical technology and judicial attempts to balance competing
doctrines: (1) The "best interests" doctrine, which governs third-party
decision-making within the framework of family law,1 2 and (2) the doctrine of individual self-determination, which is drawn from individual
rights discourse? 13 Cutting across these doctrines are two other tensions.
First, the procedural issues must be defined, considering both legal procedure and medical model norms of broad professional discretion. Second, successfully balancing the two ideologies requires recognition of the
nature of self-determination-is it paramount, does it falter when autonomy is limited or at risk, or can autonomy and interdependence be seen
as alternative dimensions of self-determination discourse?
During the last eleven years, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has
written a series of opinions that examine how decisions about removing
life-prolonging treatment should be made. While it is not the only court
to examine such issues, the five decisions offer a well-defined discussion
of what issues should be considered by courts, and how they should be
11. See'Hasenfeld, Power in Social Work Practice, 61 Soc. SERV. REv. 469 (1987); Minkier & Stone, The Feminization ofPoverty and Older Women, 25 GERoNToLoGIsT 351, 351-57
(1985); Siegel & Taeuber, Demographic Dimensions of an Aging Population, in OUR AGING
SociETY 79 (A. Pifer & L. Bronte eds. 1986).
12. See infra notes 19-29 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
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addressed.14 The court struggled to reconcile the two rationales for decision-making. In attempting to do so, however, the court found itself
unable to balance the mandates of due process with the need to use
norms of professional discretion. By examining the evolution of the
court's doctrine, this Commentary will explore how the "best interests"
doctrine was altered by reframing it as an element of, or alternative to,
self-determination. 15 This interpretation led the court to recognize the
interests of the community rather than the individual.
Part I of this Commentary examines the history of the doctrines of
"best interests" and "self-determination." It traces "best interests" from
its origin in the parenspatriaepower of the state to protect the welfare of
children and dependent citizens, to the application of the doctrine in
child welfare, civil commitment, and guardianship proceedings. It then
suggests that the "best interests" doctrine has become embedded in the
legal ideology that governs the rights of all dependent people. Its origins
in the child welfare context, however, raise questions of implementation
when the doctrine is applied to adults who are competent, partially competent, or formerly competent.
The Commentary then turns to "self-determination," articulated
here as a right to privacy in personal or psychological autonomy. After
briefly reviewing the history of this doctrine, which is usually applied to
fully competent people, it highlights the difficulty of implementing this
doctrine when those involved are physically or psychologically limited.
Further, the Commentary contends that the doctrine requires reformulation when decision-makers-judicial or otherwise-apply it to conflicts
involving elderly or dependent people.
Part II examines and critiques the five New Jersey Supreme Court
decisions that form the basis of the right-to-die analysis discussed here.
14. Numerous courts in other jurisdictions have considered this issue, both in the context
of ruling on requests to discontinue or not to initiate treatment, e.g., J.F.K. Memorial Hosp. v.
Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 922 (Fla. 1984), and in the context of a criminal proceeding for
murder, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 486
(1983). See also Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 189, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220,
220-21 (1984); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 482 A.2d 713, 718
(Super. Ct. 1984); In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 373 (D.C. 1972); Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai
Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 419-20, 497 N.E.2d 626, 627 (1986); Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 736-37, 370 N.E.2d 417, 422-23 (1977);
In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 369-70, 420 N.E.2d 64, 66-67, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 268-69, cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); Delio v. Westchester Co.Medical Center, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 679
(N.Y. App. Div. 1987); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 6, 426 N.E.2d
809, 812 (1980).
15. Courts developed the "best interests" standard as a structure for making decisions

involving persons not competent to decide for themselves. See infra notes 19-29 and accompanying text.
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It briefly traces the history of each case, and examines the court's analysis. In a piecemeal fashion, the decisions attempted to reconcile the competing doctrines of best interests and self-determination; ultimately,
however, the court was unable to articulate an approach that is both
workable and ideologically consistent.
Part III considers three alternative schemes for applying these doctrines to decisions about care for dependent or elderly people. These
schemes are drawn from differing perspectives-philosophical, 16 political, 17 and socio-legalIs-which shed light on the difficulties inherent in
reconciling the competing doctrines and in designing policy to effectuate
these standards. The philosophical and political perspectives illustrate
the dangers of a communitarian model of decision-making that too easily
can be seen as utilitarian doctrine. The socio-legal perspective addresses
some of the deficiencies of the individual rights model, which relies heavily on the discretion of the decision-maker and fails to provide a pluralistic rationale.
Part IV outlines several suggestions for reconciling the conflicting
idealogies of the best interests and self-determination doctrines. Additionally, it raises issues that should be addressed in designing a workable
standard for decision-making with regard to elderly or dependent persons whose autonomy is limited.
I.
A.

The Evolution of a Standard for Decision-Making: Best
Interests or Self-Determination

Best Interests

The best interests doctrine has become the accepted standard for
making decisions about people who are unable to exercise individual selfdetermination, due to age or lack of mental capacity. 19 It grew out of the
16. D. CALLAHAN, supra note 3, at 27; see infra notes 133-42 and accompanying text.
17. Emanuel, A Communal Vision of Care for Incompetent Patients, 17 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 15 (1987); see infra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.

18. J. HANDLER, supra note 4; Handler, Dependent People, The State, and the Modern!
Postmodern Searchfor Community, (forthcoming UCLA L. REv. 1988) [hereinafter Handler,
Dependent People];see infra notes 150-68 and accompanying text.
19. The best interests concept initially found broad acceptance as a standard for decisionmaking in child custody and foster care placement cases. Cf. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A.
SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973) [hereinafter BEYOND THE
BEST]; Boskey & McCue, Alternative Standardsfor the Termination of ParentalRights, 9 SETON HALL L. REv. 1, 19 (1978). It has become well-established in case law in the area of
custody adjudications. See Krohn v. Krohn, 217 Neb. 158, 163, 347 N.W.2d 869, 873 (1984);
Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 544, 356 N.E.2d 277, 280, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 823 (1976);
In re Jean Yvette E., 59 A.D.2d 907, 907, 399 N.Y.S.2d 249,250 (1977); see also R. MNOOKIN,
CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE 526 (1978). It has since been expanded as a standard for deciding
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parens patriae power of the state, an equitable concept that has allowed
courts or the state executive to protect the welfare of "infants, idiots and
lunatics."' 20 The state's parens patriae power ended when the person in
question (ordinarily a child) acquired sufficient maturity and competence
to make a reasoned decision. 2 ' The presumption, of course, was that the
individual's lack of maturity or autonomy was temporary, and that the
individual was potentially autonomous. Moreover, the ability of third
parties to make decisions for dependent individuals was further restricted
by the rule that the individual's interests and welfare were paramount
and were not to be sacrificed to the welfare of others.2 2 Thus, the best
interests doctrine was the standard to be applied when the courts decided
issues pursuant to parenspatriae power. Because the state had an interest in preserving the welfare of a child or an incompetent adult, that
other issues involving persons with diminished competence. See Areen, Intervention Between
Parentand Child: A Reappraisalof the State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO.
L.J. 887, 890-94 (1975); Burt, Developing ConstitutionalRights Of In and For Children, 39 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 118, 125 (1975); Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the
Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1222-25 (1980) [hereinafter Developments-The Family];
Rothman & Rothman, The Conflict Over Childrens' Rights, 10 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 7, 9
(1980); Wald, State Intervention on Behalfof "Neglected" Children: Standardsfor Removal of
Childrenfrom Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Childrenin Foster Care, and Termination
of ParentalRights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623, 642-49 (1976). See Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 751-752, 370 N.E.2d 417, 430-431 (1977), for a
detailed description of the best interests doctrine and its application to nonautonomous adults.
20. Custer, The Origin of the Doctrineof Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L. REV. 195, 203-04
(1978); Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C.L. REV. 205,
219 (1971). In Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890), the Supreme Court
described the parens patriae power as rooted in the very nature of the state in modem society.
It has therefore been viewed as a power that the members of the community have granted the
state for the protection of their future well-being. Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of the Mentally 11l,87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1208 (1974) [hereinafter DevelopmentsCivil Commitment].
While some commentators have interpreted the doctrine to mean that the state should
duplicate the decision its ward would make if competent, this is not always possible. See J.
RAwLs, supra note 4, at 248-49, which notes that if an individual's preference is not known,
decisions should be made in accordance with the "theory of primary goods." The theory of
primary goods, in this context, would apply a communitarian analysis to the best interests
standard. That is true even though the state should attempt to duplicate the decision that an
individual would have made if competent. The need to ascertain each individual's value structure, however, makes this process unworkable. Yet as we will see, the New Jersey Supreme
Court attempted to do precisely that in at least one of the cases discussed. See infra note 91
and accompanying text.
21. Developments-The Family, supra note 19, at 1223; see also Mnookin, Child-Custody
Adjudication: JudicialFunctionsin the Faceof Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PRODS. 226
(1975). Mnookin criticizes the indeterminacy inherent in application of best interests, suggesting that it invites judicial reliance on personal values. Id. at 233-35.
22.

See Developments-Civil Commitment, supra note 20, at 1208.
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person's welfare alone was the determinative factor.2 3 In the United
States, the parens patriae power was vested in the legislatures, which
often delegated that authority to the courts and to executive administrative bodies providing protective services. 24 Gradually, the doctrine was
expanded, allowing the state to remove children from their homes 25, and
the legislature to enact civil commitment statutes, which authorize involuntary commitment to mental institutions of persons considered mentally il.26

Because many parens patriae statutes have been broadly drawn,
judges and protective services agencies have had considerable discretion
in making decisions and in applying the best interests doctrine. As a
result, they often have been accused of abusing their discretion by applying their own social values and standards. 27 Critics charge that decisionmakers use their discretion not so much to promote the specific interests
of the child or incompetent person, as to further specific state objectives,
such as punishing parents who fail to meet vague standards of appropriate parenthood. 28 Thus, best interests has become a rather fluid doctrine,
allowing broad discretion on the part of the decision-maker. The decision-makers, however, do not always defer to evidence of an individual's
29
own will or perception of his or her interests.
23. Developments--The Family, supra note 19, at 1223.
24. See Areen, supra note 19, at 904; Boskey & McCue, supra note 19, at 18 n.119;
Custer, supra note 20, at 203-04. Current child custody statutes that incorporate a best interests standard into the determination of parental rights include: GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-81(a)
(Michie Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE § 16-2005(e) (1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4055
(Supp. 1987); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 48, 426(3) (West 1987).
25. Developments-The Family,supra note 19, at 1224; see also Farnham v. Pierce, 141
Mass. 203, 206, 6 N.E. 830, 832 (1886); Ex Parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1839); Milwaukee Indus. School v. Supervisors of Milwaukee Co., 40 Wis. 328, 335-36 (1876).
26. Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890).
27. Wald, supra note 19, at 649-52. Wald suggests that indeterminacy in the best interests standard results in decisions reflecting each judge's "folk psychology." See Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 768-69 (1982); In re J.J.B., 390 N.W.2d 274, 279, rev'g 369
N.W.2d 593 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1377 (Utah 1982).
28. Developments-The Family, supra note 19, at 1224; see also Schoen, The Field of the
Juvenile Court, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON JUVENILE COURT STANDARDS 32,

34 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CHILDRENS' BUREAU PUB. No. 97 (1922) ("The State is bound to
step in and give the child the same protective care and training that normal parents give to
normal children in normal homes in civilized, socialized, conventional communities"). See
generally A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS (2d ed. 1977); E. RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS
(1978).
29. Recently, two relatively distinct threads of best-interests analysis have emerged. One
thread attempts to construct or reconstruct the person's wishes through testamentary evidence, or some other form of factual information. This thread can be seen in the doctrine of
substitute consent, which attempts to set a standard for decision-making that would effectuate
the perceived wishes of an incompetent person. See Civil Commitment: Guardianship,Substi-
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In this respect, the best interests doctrine can be interpreted as limiting an individual's exercise of a right to self-determination. So far, child
welfare is the only area in which incapacity has justified diminishing a
fundamental right. 30 In this context, courts have viewed preservation of
the family community (or the state acting as family) as superceding any
individual privacy right that a child might have. This is a communitarian, rather than individual, view of rights. The diminution in individual
rights inherent in the communitarian approach, however, is less defensible when applied to persons with partial competence or a past history of
competence. Therefore, this doctrine should not govern decision-making
for individuals whose autonomy has become limited due to age or
31
disability.
B. Self-Determination
In most instances, an element of self-determination is inherent in the
parenspatriae doctrine. The state is free to use its parens patriaepower
only if, in its application of the best interests standard, it does not inter32
fere with an individual's autonomy or exercise of self-determination.
tute Consent, and the Right to Refuse Psychiatric Treatment, 20 GONZ. L. REV. 479, 488
(1985). In In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980), the court stated that this
determination must include examination of the values and preferences of the incompetent person (when competent). See also In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744, 750 (D.D.C. 1979); Rogers v.
Commissoner of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308, 315 (1983); In re Custody of
a Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 716, 434 N.E.2d 601, 609 (1982). The other thread of analysis relies
on the discretion of the decision-maker to ascertain what course of action, in the decisionmaker's view, will best benefit the individual. This is the perception most commonly articulated in the child welfare area. BEYOND THE BEST, supra note 19, at 62-63, frames this analysis in psycho-social terms, with regard to child custody decisions, arguing that custody
decisions need to be formulated in such a way as to incorporate the particular psychological
orientation of children. The standard has become widely accepted in the years since the book
was written, and judges often rely upon their own judgment or that of a social worker or
psychologist in reaching a determination of "best interests." See Skolnick, The Limits of
Childhood: Conceptions of Child Development & Social Context, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
38, 41 (1975). The doctrine has also increasingly been applied with regard to mentally disabled adults and increasingly to partially competent adults and the infirm elderly. See Skolnick, Proxy Consentfor Incompetent Non-terminally Il Adult Patients, 6 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 2
(1985).
30. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1978).
31. See Destro, Quality of Life, Ethics, and ConstitutionalJurisprudence: The Demise of
Natural Rights and Equal Protection for the Disabled and Incompetent, 2 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL. 71 (1986) (questioning whether the state should have the power to make
quality of life decisions for nonautonomous people); Weber, SubstitutedJudgment Doctrine: A
CriticalAnalysis, 1 IssuES L. & MED. 131, 138 (1985).
32. Developments-Civil Commitment, supra note 20, at 10-11. As the doctrine has been
interpreted in the child welfare area, a state might characterize its role as acting for the child
rather than imposing its will on a child as a substitute decision-maker. See Parham, 442 U.S.
at 607-08. This implies a narrower reading of the best interests standard than most courts and
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Thus, the state cannot use parens patriae power to shield it from the
requirements of due process. 33 Courts have also found that the right to
privacy is a critical element of self-determination, and that individuals
have a privacy interest in deliberative processes. 34 Using this reasoning,
courts have also found a privacy interest inherent in the decision to
forego or to remove life-prolonging treatment.3 5 The situation is more
complicated where an individual is partially competent, or has been competent in the past and has clearly expressed her will regarding certain

decisions.36

commentators have given when adults are involved as plaintiffs. See Rothman & Rothman,
supra note 19, at 7. For application to cases involving adult nonautonomous persons, see In re
Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 565-66, 432 N.E.2d 712, 720 (1982) (substituted judgment standard); In
re Terwilliger, 304 Pa. Super. 553, 564, 450 A.2d 1376, 1382 (1982).
33. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439-41 (1985); see also
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
34. Judge Cardozo, while a New York appellate judge, first recognized an individual's
right to privacy in bodily integrity with respect to medical treatment. Schloendorff v. Society
of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 127, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914); see also Lojuk v. Quandt, 706 F.2d
1456, 1465 (7th Cir. 1983); Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1980);
Keyhea v. Rushen, 178 Cal. App. 3d 526, 536, 223 Cal. Rptr. 746, 751 (1986); People v.
Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 967 n.2 (Colo. 1985) (finding state constitutional and common law right
to privacy); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 408, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (1960). But see
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982) (Supreme Court upheld Romeo's right to
privacy as to the abuses complained of, but found that medical professionals had broad discretion as to particular treatment modalities within the institution); see Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d
939, 946 (3d Cir. 1976); Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905, 910-11 (Minn. 1976); see also
Zlotnick, First Do No Harm Least Restrictive Alternative Analysis and the Right of Mental
Patients to Refuse Treatment, 83 W. VA. L. REv. 375, 417-23 (1981). This position is also
supported by FED. R. Civ. P. 35.
35. Annas, Reconciling Quinlan and Saikewicz: Decision-Makingfor the Terminally-Ill
Incompetent,4 AM. J. L. & MED. 367 (1979); Note, EqualBut Incompetent: ProceduralImplications of a Terminally Ill Person'sRight to Die, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 148 (1984) (authored by
Kimarie R. Stratos) [hereinafter Note, Equal But Incompetent]; Comment, The Role of the
Family in Medical Decision Making For Incompetent Adult Patients: A HistoricalPerspective
and a CaseAnalysis, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 539 (1987) (authored by Elaine B. Krasik) [hereinafter Comment, The Role of the Family]. While state courts have generally found that the right
to refuse treatment is encompassed in the right to privacy, In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 49-53,
355 A.2d 647, 668-70, cerL denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); see
infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text, some courts have refused to extend this right when
the life of an unborn child would be risked or threatened. See In re A.C., 533 A.2d 616, 617
(D.C. App. 1987) (granting the request of a hospital to require a terminally ill woman to
undergo surgery to deliver a child, despite her objections); see also Note, EqualBut Incompetent, supra, at 151-53.
36. Some commentators have argued that weakened mental capacity reduces the importance to an individual of various rights like privacy, and thereby excludes such rights from the
category of fundamental interests, on the theory that an individual cannot meaningfully exercise liberty rights without the capacity for choice. See Developments-Civil Commitment,
supra note 20, at 1194 & n.12. See generally Comment, Liberty and Required Mental Health
Treatment, 114 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1067, 1067 (1966) ("To the extent that a man's psycho-dynamic mechanism cannot balance conflicting forces, he is unable to satisfy this own wants. To
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In the medical context, self-determination has been implemented
through the doctrine of "informed consent," which grants patients the
rights to full information and participation in decisions about their treatment. 37 In practice, however, the doctrine of informed consent has been
difficult to apply because the standards defining informed consent are
still uncertain. The applicable standard has shifted from one that was
physician-centered to one that is patient-centered. While the physiciancentered standard relies on the standards of the "professional community," 38 the patient-centered standard is determined by what information
would be necessary to inform adequately a "reasonable lay person" of the
concomitant risks and benefits associated with a particular course of
39
action.
Aside from the difficulties inherent in applying this vague standard,
there are additional problems with the informed consent doctrine as an
expression of self-determination. Abstract legal doctrines are not always
sufficient to alter the character of the physician-patient relationship,
which has characteristics that are essentially paternalistic. Patient denial
or inability to fully comprehend the information serves as a potential
limit to truly informed consent, as does the hospital's or physician's fear
of legal liability. Finally, and as a result of these problems, informed
consent forms are often so lengthy and so detailed that most of the comprehensible information is lost. 4°
this extent, his liberty is diminished."). Whether a right is fundamental, however, is determined solely by finding it is explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution. See
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-40; San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30-34
(1973). Moreover, there is great potential for abuse if an assertion of diminished capacity or
other perceptual limitation can be used to diminish or eliminate a substantive right.
37. The "informed consent" doctrine is recognized through both the common law and
legislative enactments. R. MACKLIN, supra note 8, at 12, 35-48; see also Capron, Informed
Consent in CatastrophicDisease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 424-25
(1972); Gauvey, Leviton, Shuger & Sykes, Informed and Substituted Consent to Health Care
Procedures: A Proposalfor State Legislatures, 15 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 431, 440 (1978); Meiset,
Informed Consent to Medical Treatment. An Analysis of Recent Legislation, 41 U. PITT. L.
REV. 407, 409-10 (1980).
38. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 409-10, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (1960).
39. This test is, by definition, a subjective one. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,
780 (D.C. Cir. 1972); R. MACKLIN, supra note 8, at 45-46.
40. See C. LIDZ & A. MEISEL, INFORMED CONSENT AND THE STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL
CARE 397 (1987); Pernick, The Patient'sRole in Medical Decisionmaking: A Social History of
Informed Consent in Medical Therapy, in 3 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2,
at 34. When the medical problem itself limits a person's cogency, the problem is even more
troubling. Stone, Informed Consent: Special Problemsfor a Psychiatric Hospital, 30 J. Hosp.
COMMUN. PSYCHOLOGY 321, 326-27 (1979). The MODEL HEALTH CARE CONSENT ACT, 9
U.L.A. 440 (West Supp. 1986), attempts to address some of these issues. See also Cobbs v.
Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972) (disclosure should be
patient-centered).
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Allocation of Medical Services

"

The conflict between the theoretical frameworks of self-determination and best interests doctrines has particular relevance to a modem
welfare state that provides social and medical services. Access to medical technology, like other social services, is not guaranteed to individuals
by right, but is ordinarily allocated on the basis of community or group
needs. While the state places a high value on personal autonomy and
seeks societal protection of threats to autonomy, the provision of medical
services raises a significant dilemma because the state both protects individual autonomy (by providing for an individual's welfare) and threatens
it (by making allocation of services dependent on the consent of the plu-

rality).41 Since distribution occurs through negotiation in the political
process, or through a process of claiming through professional-client relationships, 42 those with limited autonomy are unable to participate fully
in the process. The presumed discretionary power of professionals has
been restricted recently in negotiations with parties of limited autonomy,
in part by constraints imposed by procedural mandates, 4 3 and in part by
shifting power relationships between clients and service providers. 44 The
41.

See B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 3 (1980); West, Juris-

prudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (1988). This Commentary, however, is not
intended to be a critique of liberalism, or an argument that liberalism has fundamentally failed
in its mission. See, ag., M. SANDAL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMrrS OF JUSTICE 133 (1982);

Michaelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100
HARV. L. REv. 4, 66-73 (1985); see also Gutmann, CommunitarianCritics of Liberalism, 14
PHIL. & PUB. AF. 308, 314 (1985). It is, rather, an attempt to incorporate an ethos of community within the liberal definition of due process. See, eg., C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE 6-8 (1982); Minow, supra note 5.
42. L. PEATTIE & M. REIN, WOMEN'S CLAIMS: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 19,
21 (1983). The authors state that the vocabulary of "claiming" is used to "develop a language
which makes it possible to make the connection between ...political and social processes at
the micro level, in which there is a social negotiation of reality, and the more macro-social and
political economy." Id. at vii. They note:
People who work in the micro tradition talk about the negotiation of reality between
doctor and patient, citizen and bureaucrat, husband and wife; there is a tendency to
leave this account at the interpersonal level. Those working at the macro level try to
give accounts of broader institutional processes, which tend to be bereft of the personal content of role and experience.
Ird. Social conventions can therefore remove aspects of the distributional system from public
discussion, and thereby delineate a "false consciousness" of rights.
43. Smith v. O.F.F.E.R., 431 U.S. 816, 847-49 (1977); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309,
317 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, rehg denied, 398 U.S. 914 (1970); Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-71 (1970); see also Choper, Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions UpholdingIndividual ConstitutionalRights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1, 146-58 (1984); Mashaw,
The Management Side ofDue Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assumption of Accuracy, Fairnessand Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59
CORNELL L. REv. 772, 813-14 (1974).
44. See F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, THE NEW CLASS WAR: REAGAN'S ATTACK ON THE
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following discussion of the New Jersey cases illustrates some of these
changing relationships.
II.

The New Jersey Cases

A. The Stories
This Commentary discusses an ideological evolution, which has
taken place in the context of stories that illustrate the nature of the conflict. The stories are about the suffering of individuals, their families, and
their communities, suffering which tests the limits of professional, medical, and judicial competence. They leave indelible impressions upon even
those not directly affected.
The first story began in April 1975. Twenty-one year old Karen
Ann Quinlan attended a party and, for reasons still unknown, suffered
respiratory arrest. She was rushed to a hospital where doctors artificially
revived her respiratory functions. Within a few days it became clear that
she would remain comatose, in a chronic and persistent vegetative state,
although she was not brain-dead according to accepted standards. Several months later, after becoming convinced that Karen would never recover from this vegetative state, and upon consultation with family
members and clergy, Karen's father sought permission to have her respi45
rator disconnected. The hospital refused.
The second story involves Claire Conroy, an elderly resident of a
nursing home. In 1979, Claire's nephew, who had been appointed her
legal guardian, placed her in the home after she developed organic brain
syndrome. Her condition deteriorated over the next three years, and
during one of several hospitalizations, a naso-gastric tube was inserted to
provide nourishment because she was not eating on her own. By 1983,
although she was not comatose, her doctors considered her to be semivegetative and marginally cognitive, with a life-expectancy of less than
one year. Her nephew sought removal of the naso-gastric tube, which
would have allowed his aunt to die, as he believed she would have desired
46
were she competent to decide. The nursing home opposed his request.
In 1982, Kathleen Farrell, a thirty-two year old keypunch operator
with two teenage sons, developed symptoms of Arterial Lateral Sclerosis
(ALS). Her condition deteriorated rapidly. In 1983, after a period of
118-21 (1982); Lipskey, BureaucraticDisentitlement in Social Welfare Programs, 58 Soc. SERV. REV. 3, 8-9 (1984); Simon, Invention and
Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1985).
45. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 18, 355 A.2d 647, 651, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v.
New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
46. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 336-42, 486 A.2d 1209, 1216 (1985).
WELFARE STATE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
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hospitalization, she was returned to her home, paralyzed, connected to a
respirator, but mentally competent. She continued in that state for three
years. At her request, in 1986, her husband petitioned the court for permission to disconnect the respirator and allow her to die.4 7
Hilda Peter was a sixty-five year old secretary at a hospital in New
Jersey. In 1984, her companion, Eberhard Johanning, returned from
work to find her collapsed on the kitchen floor. She was resuscitated by
paramedics, but remained in a comatose, persistently vegetative state, attached to a respirator and fed by a naso-gastric tube. Ultimately, she was
transferred to a nursing home. Eberhard held Hilda's power of attorney,
which contained a "living will." 48 In 1985, he asked the nursing home to
withdraw the naso-gastric tube, on the grounds that Hilda would choose
49
to do so if she were competent. The nursing home refused that request.
In March 1980, twenty-four year old Nancy Ellen Jobes, eight
months pregnant, was injured in an automobile accident. During surgery, performed to terminate the pregnancy because the fetus had died in
the accident, Nancy sustained a severe loss of oxygen to her brain. As a
result, she suffered irreversible and massive brain damage. In July, she
was transferred to a nursing home, where she remained in a persistent
vegetative state, connected to a respirator, and fed through a tube inserted into her abdomen. In 1985, her husband and parents asked the
nursing home to remove the abdominal tube and allow her to die, stating
that if Nancy was competent that is what she would choose to do. The
nursing home refused. 50
These tragic stories have much in common. All were adults who
had been competent, autonomous individuals. All had close caring families and friends who were concerned for their welfare. Their cases ultimately were decided by the same appellate court, after lengthy pretrial,
47. In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 344-45, 529 A.2d 404, 408-09 (1987).
48. A living will is a formal, written statement of a person's wishes regarding life-support,
organ donation, and medical treatment, made when a person is competent. Such forms are
often attached to the more traditional testamentary wills. In many areas, living will forms are
being distributed by advocacy groups for the elderly or by state medical associations. A living
will often contains a durable power of attorney; however, that is a separate form designating

who a person chooses to be a substitute decision-maker, both for living will decisions and other
matters. See California Natural Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7187(f) et seq.
(West Supp. 1988); SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILL LAWS

1981-1984 (1984); see also J.F.K. Memorial Hosp. v. BIudworth, 452 So.2d 921, 926 (Fla.
1984) (a living will is "persuasive evidence" of a person's intention); The California Durable
Power of Attorney for Health Care Decisions Act CAL. CIV. CODE § 2430 et seq. (West Supp.

1988).
49. In re Peter by Johanning, 108 N.J. 365, 370-71, 529 A.2d 419, 422 (1987).
50. In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 401-02, 529 A.2d 434, 437 (1987).
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trial, and administrative proceedings. 5 1 In all but one case, that of Claire
Conroy, the court finally granted the petition, or indicated that the peti52
tion would have been granted had death not preceded the decision.
There were, however, some differences. When Karen Quinlan's respirator was disconnected, she was able to breathe on her own and,
although comatose, remained alive for six years until she died from pneumonia. Claire Conroy and Kathleen Farrell died of so-called "natural
causes" prior to the court's decisions. In both instances, the New Jersey
Supreme Court retained jurisdiction in order to render opinions that
would benefit future decisions on these issues. Nancy Ellen Jobes and
Hilda Peter died shortly after life support was withdrawn, following the
court's decision to grant the families' petitions.
Unfortunately, the opinions provide little guidance for reconciling
the protection of individual rights with the need for a generalized decision-making standard. 53 What is most troubling is that the court emphasized a communitarian decision-making process, 54 but did not clarify the
role that individual choices should play in the process. The decisions,
therefore, shed little light on how individuals who are old or disabled and
who lack an immediate and supportive community should be treated.
Additionally, a concurring opinion in In re Jobes termed the opinions
"morally ambiguous, 5 5 noting:
[T]he facts of these cases foreshadow situations in which society and
the judicial system will be confronted with treatment decisions that are
morally even more intractable [than these have been.] It may be possible to gradually discern acceptable societal norms of humane treatment of moribund patients. Just as constitutional norms of privacy
51. Karen Quinlan's case was decided in 1976. The court did not reach the issue again
until 1985, when it decided In re Conroy. In June of 1987, the court handed down opinions in
the other three cases on the same day.
52. Jobes, 108 N.J. at 426-28, 529 A.2d at 451-52; Peter, 108 N.J. at 384-85, 529 A.2d at
429-30; In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 358-59, 529 A.2d 404, 415-16 (1987); In re Quinlan, 70
N.J. 10, 54-55, 355 A.2d 647, 671-72, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976).
53. In 1985, the New Jersey Assembly attempted to address this lack of an adequate
standard by creating the New Jersey Commission on Legal and Ethical Problems in the Delivery of Health Care. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:9y 1-6 (West 1986). The Commission's mandate is
to study the issues created by the evolution of medical technology and to report to the Governor, legislature, and public by December 1988, and every three years thereafter. Id.
54. In these cases, the New Jersey Court codified a trend that has become increasingly
accepted as a criteria to be used in making decisions for nonautonomous persons. See Abram,
Privacy in the Medical Context, 23 J. FAM. L. 173, 189 (1985); Childress, Refusal of Lifesaving
Treatment by Adults, 23 J. FAM. L. 191, 207 (1985); Comment, The Role of the Family, supra
note 35, at 551 nn.100 & 103; see also In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 384-85, 420 N.E.2d 64, 75,
438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 277 (Jones, J., dissenting in part), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
55. Jobes, 108 N.J. at 431-32, 529 A.2d at 453 (Handler, J.,concurring).

November 1988]

RIGHT TO DIE

must be shaped by the "traditions and collective conscience of the people," so the common law of handling dying patients will be shaped by
shared notions of how "we" citizens want to be treated at that critical
juncture. That is, shared notions of human dignity will
56 ultimately govern decision-making on behalf of moribund patients.

As society refines its notions of dignified treatment for those with limited
autonomy, the rights and interests of the community and individuals will
have to be clarified so that those with and without community support
will not have to suffer needlessly. The following section will examine the
issues considered by the New Jersey Supreme Court as it attempted to
address this interplay between community and individual.
B.

The Issues: A Summary

Three issues were central to the court's consideration of these cases.
First, there was a concerted attempt to balance the individual's right of
self-determination and the state's duty to make decisions in the best interests of nonautonomous people. 57 Second, all of the participants in the
cases, but particularly the courts and the medical profession, sought to
develop procedures which would allow "substitute consenters" to make
decisions for incompetent persons. 58 This involved a consideration of
what competence means, both in legal and medical terms, and whether
that concept was valid in this context. Third, the court remained uncertain whether the standard should incorporate the procedural protections
of the legal process model or the more discretionary approach of the
medical and social service professions. 59 As a result, the New Jersey
56. Id. at 444, 529 A.2d at 460 (quoting N. CANTOR, LEGAL FRONTIERS OF DEATH AND
DYING 76-77 (1987)).

57. See infra notes 68-82, 90-97, 111-17, 119-24, 126-29 and accompanying text.
58. In re Peter by Johanning, 108 N.J. 365, 384, 529 A.2d 419, 429 (1987); In re Farrell,
108 N.J. 335, 355-56, 529 A.2d 404, 414 (1987); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 363, 486 A.2d
1209, 1231 (1985); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 54, 355 A.2d 647, 671, cert. denied sub nom.
Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). "The 'substituted judgment' approach to decisionmaking for patients in the persistent vegetative state is our ideal." Jobes, 108 N.J. at 424, 529
A.2d at 449. This seems to equate the process of self-determination with application of a "best
interests" standard.
59. As indicated earlier, this dilemma is a continuing aspect of the best interests/selfdetermination debate. The New Jersey Supreme Court moved from a more discretionary standard of professional decision making in Quinlan, to a standard that relied heavily on procedural protections, in Conroy, and back to a more discretionary approach, in the Jobes trilogy.
See Shultz, From Informed Consent to PatientChoice: 4 New ProtectedInterest, 95 YALE L.J.
219, 276-81 (1985); see also In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744, 750-51 (D.D.C. 1979) (standard used is
"best medical interests"). In Conroy, the court took the unique approach of mandating participation of a state administrative agency-the Office of Ombudsman-in the decision-making
process by designating right to die petitions as instances of potential abuse. In re Conroy, 98
N.J. at 383-84, 486 A.2d at 1241-42. The New Jersey Ombudsman is a neutral investigative
agency for elderly institutionalized persons. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27GI8 (West 1986).
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Supreme Court was called upon to mediate competing moral and social
systems-the family, medical and service professions, as well as concerns
of ethics and religion. 6°
Initially, the court attempted to resolve those conflicts by applying a
rigid classification structure. The specific outcomes of individual cases
seemed to hinge on differences of age, place of confinement, and family or
community involvement. Karen Quinlan, whose life-support was disconnected with court approval, was comatose, young, and confined in a hospital. Her family was closely involved in all decisions relating to her
treatment. In contrast, Claire Conroy was elderly, "neurologically impaired" though not comatose, and a nursing home resident. In her case,
the court refused to permit removal of life-support. Her only living relative was a nephew. Kathleen Farrell was competent and resided at home
with her husband and children. Hilda Peter was an elderly comatose
patient in a hospital; her designated guardian was her companion, Mr.
Johanning. Nancy Ellen Jobes was a young comatose patient in a nursing home, and her husband and parents were all closely involved in decisions about her treatment.
While the differences to a lay observer seem insignificant, the New
Jersey Supreme Court considered them to be sufficiently important that
earlier precedents based upon different facts were not applied. 6 1 Thus,
for each decision, the court re-evaluated its earlier analysis; no form of
analysis suggested itself as universal. The court continually struggled to
achieve a careful balance among competing considerations. The decisions move along a continuum, from a rights-orientation to a recognition
of the importance the values of community play in both the process and
The court approved this approach in the Jobes trilogy, but noted that the agency had authority
only in the cases of nursing home patients. Peter, 108 N.J. at 374-77, 529 A.2d at 423-25. This
approach reflects the court's concern both with too much procedure and too broad discretion.
60. It is clear that the pressures on the court in these cases came not only from the legal
system and its imposition of values upon medical culture, but also from the internal conflicts
that stem from the emotional impact of the situation. This is not a new phenomenon. As one
judge noted in In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 385, 420 N.E.2d 64, 75, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 277
(Jones, J., dissenting in part), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981), "for many years physicians
and members of patient's families, often in consultation with religious counselors, have in actuality been making [informal] decisions to withhold or to withdraw life support." In J. KATZ,
THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 80-82 (1986), Jay Katz speaks about the
internal dialogue between doctors and their patients, which has both internal (silent) and external (verbal) components. Katz maintains that judicial decisions about medical relationships
usually fail to recognize the harm done when a physician fails to converse with a patient "in
ways that strengthen patient autonomy." But others have also recognized the presumptive
role for families, clergy and other elements of a person's community. See Comment, The Role
of the Family, supra note 35, at 551 nn.100 & 103.
61. See infra notes 87, 112, 121, 128 and accompanying text.
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the implementation of self-determination, for those with limited

autonomy.
While the court seemed, in every case but Conroy, to embrace a

communitarian view of rights, important questions were left unaddressed. The court never precisely defined the relevant community for
determining the rights of incompetents, or whether the court would embrace the views of several communities. 62 The court also failed to clarify
whether in its application of the best interests doctrine, it viewed best
interests as an element of self-determination. Finally, the court remained

ambivalent about whether decisions should follow the stricter procedural
63
model or the more discretionary medical model.

C. In re Quinlan
In re Quinlan64 brought the question of life support removal before
the New Jersey Supreme Court for the first time. Several months after
Karen became comatose, her family was finally convinced that there was
no hope for her recovery. They asked the hospital to disconnect her respirator and when the hospital refused, they sought the court's

permission. 65
In considering the family's request, the New Jersey Supreme Court
first considered whether Karen's condition was sufficiently grave, and her
life expectancy sufficiently limited, to warrant an affirmative act. 66 Only
then did the court consider whether and by what means the respirator
could be removed. The court found that Karen was in a persistent vegetative state, with a life expectancy of less than one year. 67 The court
considered two issues to be determinative in framing its analysis: (1)
62. The concurring opinion in Jobes raised compelling arguments about the need for the
legal system as well as society at large to effectively balance the multiple interests, especially in
cases where families or concerned communities are not present. Jobes, 108 N.J. at 428-47, 529
A.2d at 452-61.
63. The court approved both best interests analysis and individual self-determination as
its consideration of decisional strategies. It is unclear, however, from case to case, where the
standard is to be set. See Minow, Beyond State Interventionin the Family: ForBaby Jane Doe,
18 MICH. . L. REFORM 933, 972-73 (1985). But cf Capron, supra note 37, at 424-25; Smith,
Defective Newborns and Government Intermeddling, 25 MED. Sci. & L. 44, 47 (1985).
64. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d. 647, cert deniedsub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
65. I4 at 22-34, 355 A.2d at 653-60.
66. Compare actions that require affirmative behavior to carry out such as the removal of
a respirator or feeding tube, with passive acts such as those contemplated in the "Do Not
Resuscitate" or "No Code" orders on terminal patient's charts, which have become commonplace in many hospitals. See Evans & Brody, The Do Not Resuscitate Order in Teaching Hospitals, 253 J. A.M.A. 2236 (1985).
67. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 26, 355 A.2d at 655.
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whether Karen had a privacy right regarding the decision to withdraw
treatment, regardless of her competence and (2) if that right existed, how
that right should be exercised.
Resting its decision upon state and federal rights of privacy, common-law as well as constitutional, 68 the court found that Karen's right to
privacy included the right to terminate life-sustaining treatment. 69 As
expected, the court also found that Karen was not competent to decide
for herself about treatment or cessation of treatment; thus, she was unable to exercise her right to privacy or self-determination. 70 The court,
however, found that the right could not be discarded solely because her
71
condition prevented her conscious exercise of that choice.
Having established the existence of Karen's privacy right, the court
then looked for a third-party procedure that would preserve that right.
It did so through the guardian system. Although it seems central to the
exercise of any privacy right, 72 the court ultimately rejected the notion
that Karen's privacy right incorporated a right to self-determination.
Accordingly, it refused to consider an attempt to document Karen's own
wishes in this regard, including her prior statements about not wanting
to "be a vegetable."' 73 In this respect, the court declined to assert that a
nonautonomous Karen might be able to express her prior wishes. Instead, the court superimposed the best interests doctrine upon Karen's
right to privacy and thereby closely circumscribed the exercise of that
right.
The court did this by making procedural due process communitarian, that is by making the decision to terminate life support contingent on
Karen's best interests, determined in the discretion of the decisionmaker. While the court viewed procedural due process as a means of
preserving Karen's individual rights, the socio-medical nature of the de68. These were based upon what Roscoe Pound called "rights of personality." Id. at 38
n.7, 355 A.2d at 662 n.7 (referring to Pound, EquitableReliefAgainst Defamation and Injuries
to Personality, 29 HARV. L. REV. 640 (1916)).
69. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 49-53, 355 A.2d at 668-70.
70. Id. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664.
71. Id. at 49-53, 355 A.2d at 668-70.
72. Cf Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-55 (1974); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). Griswold was the first case in which the U.S. Supreme Court characterized a constitutional right to privacy, including within that protection "intimate relationship[s]." Griswold,
381 U.S at 485-86. In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court extended that protection to a woman's
right to abort a fetus, at least during the first trimester. See also Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan.
393, 408, 530 P.2d 1093, 1104 (1960) (common law privacy right); Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 740-41, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977)
(medical treatment); Childress, supra note 54, at 207.
73. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 664.
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cision distinguished it from strictly legal decisions, which are the unique
purview of the courts and the legislatures. 74 Socio-medical decisions do
not necessarily carry with them the same clear-cut individual protections, grounded in self-determination, that legal decisions carry. Moreover, they are apparently governed by communitarian, rather than
individualistic standards. Under this formulation, removal of life-support is a discretionary choice under the doctrine of individual self-determination, but on closer inspection the choice is actually made in best
75
interest terms.
As applied to this case, the court could appoint Joseph Quinlan as

his daughter's legal guardian, and he, in turn, could decide whether removing the respirator was in Karen's best interests. 76 His powers were
limited, however, by the communitarian nature of the best interest doctrine; he needed the consent of the attending physician and the hospital's
ethics committee before any decision could be carried out. 77 The court
couched the "substitut6d judgment" standard in traditional "best interests" language, finding that the decision must be based upon the substitute decision-makers' understanding of what was in Karen's "best
74. Id. at 50, 355 A.2d at 669.
75. The right to privacy may also support a principle of professional discretion that goes
as much toward protecting the professional's relationship with a patient or client as the patient
or client's right to privacy. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. In Roe, as here, the preservation of
professional medical discretion had the result of circumscribing the exercise of the privacy
right for individuals. At least for second and third trimester pregnancies, the right to privacy
is limited by what a doctor might see as the best interests of the mother. See Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759 (1986); City of Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 427 (1983); see also Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324-25 (1982) (upholding both the patient/client's right to privacy and
the medical staff's professional discretion).
76. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 54, 355 A.2d at 671. Here, the family's request to withdraw
treatment concerned only removal of a respirator. At the time, this did not appear to be a
material distinction because it was assumed that Ms. Quinlan would die shortly after the respirator was removed. While the Quinlans did not seek to remove or to stop artificial feeding, the
requests for withdrawal of treatment in the subsequent cases did involve removal of feeding
tubes and other essential life support apparati without which the patient's death was certain.
77. Id. at 54-55, 355 A.2d at 671-72. This portion of the Supreme Court's decision reversed the trial court. The trial court had been concerned that Joseph Quinlan might not be
able to separate his own interests from those of his daughter; therefore it had permitted him to
be her legal guardian but required that an independent guardian be appointed for the purposes
of deciding whether the respirator could be withdrawn. In that respect, the trial court addressed an issue that did not reach the New Jersey Supreme Court until several years later. In
In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 242, 426 A.2d 467, 470 (1981), the parents of a mentally retarded
young woman had asked the court to let them have her sterilized. Ironically, the reasons were
that sterilization would permit her to have a "normal," sexually active life in the group home
where she lived, without the worry of an unwanted pregnancy. The Supreme Court rejected
the parents' request, stating that the interests of the parents and those of the child could not be
sufficiently distinguished from one another.
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interests," and not necessarily upon what Karen would have done had
she been competent.

78

The court also found that the individual privacy right was limited by
the need to balance important state interests-in preserving life, in
preventing suicide, in preserving the integrity of the medical profession,
and in protecting innocent third parties. 79 These interests, however, were
not sufficiently strong to limit the exercise of Karen's right to privacy.
On balance, the court found that the state's interest weakens, and the
individual's right to privacy grows, as the degree of bodily intrusion increases and the patient's prognosis for recovery becomes poorer. Therefore, the court ultimately found that there would be a point at which an
individual's privacy right would overcome virtually any state interest.80
In this manner, the court utilized two standards for different stages
of the decision-making process. First, a doctrine of self-determination
was applied to decide whether the right to privacy included the right to a
particular treatment or withdrawal of treatment. Second, the best interests doctrine was used to decide how such a right should be implemented
when a person is not competent to make a decision. By adopting these
doctrines, in effect the court separated the decisions by ideology-selfdetermination doctrine utilizing a legal model and best interests utilizing
socio-medical constructs. 81 This bifurcation obviated, at least temporarily, the need for the court to address the interaction or conflict between
82
the professional systems.
78. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 49-53, 355 A.2d at 668-70.
79. Id. at 39-44, 355 A.2d at 663-65.
80. Id. at 43, 355 A.2d at 665.
81. While the best interests doctrine is also embedded in legal ideology, its origin is in the
medical model, as that has been implemented through the state's exercise of its parens patriae
power. See supra notes 19-29 and accompanying text.
82. The court made clear its aversion to judicial decisionmaking as a routine mechanism
for deciding such cases. By mandating the inclusion of hospital ethics committees, the court
made interaction among professionals a linchpin of its decision. The committees were to be "a
regular forum . . .to allow the responsibility of these situations to be shared." Quinlan, 70
N.J. at 49, 355 A.2d at 668. The committees would be multidisciplinary, composed of "physicians, social workers, attorneys and theologians [who would] review the individual circumstances of the ethical dilemmas [and would provide] safeguards for patients and their medical
caretakers." Id. While the subsequent cases return again to the idea of the hospital-based
ethics committee, their role as mediators of communitarian ideology has not yet been realized.
See Murray, Where Are The Ethics in Ethics Committees?, 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 12
(1988). For a discussion of possible liability attaching to decisions of ethics committees, see
Merritt, The Tort Liability of Hospital Ethics Committees, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1987).
See also Buchanan, Medical Paternalismor Legal Imperialism: Not the Only Alternatives for
Handling Saikewicz-type Cases, 5 AM. J. L. & MED. 97, 111 (1979) (endorsing non-hospitalbased ethics committees that are dissociated from hospital medical staff); Rubin, Refusal of
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D. In re Conroy: Self-Determination and Substitute Consent
Claire Conroy presented different issues for the court to decide. Unlike Karen Quinlan, Claire's nephew was the only close family member
who took responsibility for her care. Also unlike Karen Quinlan, she
was not comatose. At the time her nephew applied to the court for permission to remove the feeding tube, however, doctors considered Claire's
condition to be semi-vegetative, marginally cognitive, and terminal.
In many respects legal and medical theories about self-determination converge in In re Conroy.8 3 The court attempted to create a mechanism whereby critical care decisions such as withdrawal of treatment
could be made by substitute consenting parties, without the bifurcation
of decision-making roles that it had imposed in Quinlan. The court,
however, gave great weight to the procedural aspects of decision-making,
thereby creating a structure that could not be implemented readily.
After Claire Conroy had been a resident of a nursing home for several years, her mental and physical state deteriorated to the point that
she was adjudged incompetent, and her nephew was appointed guardian.
As her condition deteriorated still further, she became bedridden, with
serious physical and mental impairments. By 1983, doctors believed she
would die within the year. After repeated hospitalizations for dehydration and infections, she was placed on a naso-gastric feeding tube-so
that she would receive adequate nutrition. Although she was not comatose, her condition was semi-vegetative, with "intellectual functioning
permanently reduced to a very primitive level." 84 After her nephew became convinced that her condition was terminal, he sought to have the
feeding tube removed, arguing that if she were competent that is what
she would have chosen to do. The attending physicians at the hospital
85
refused.
The trial court appointed a guardian ad litem to represent Claire's
interests in the proceeding. After the trial court refused to grant the
86
nephew's request, the New Jersey Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction.
In deciding the case, the court departed drastically from the best interests
doctrine it had used in Quinlan and imposed a complex set of procedures
Life-Sustaining Treatmentfor Terminally-IllIncompetent Patients: Court Orders and an Alternative, 19 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 19, 60-67 (1985).
83. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
84. Id at 335-42, 486 A.2d at 1216-19.
85. I1dat 340, 486 A.2d at 1218.
86. The New Jersey Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction despite the fact that Ms. Conroy had died prior to the intermediate court hearing, stating that it was doing so because life
for patients in such circumstances was sufficiently tenuous that the issues might not be reviewed if death mooted argument of the issues. Id at 341, 486 A.2d at 1219.
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for determining substituted consent, which would effectuate self-determination. While the court noted several subtle factual distinctions, the
court's analytical shift probably reflects a dissatisfaction with the Quinlan rationale. 87 The Conroy court's reasoning illustrates the legal culture's impact on medical decision-making procedures. It also highlights
some differences in the legal and medical cultures' perceptions of similar
issues.
As far as the medical community was concerned, Claire's medical
condition alone dictated the decision-making process. Her cognitive
functioning was minimal, and her life expectancy was extremely limited.
The key medical issues were, first, whether her condition fit medicallyaccepted definitions of death (it did not); and second, whether the feeding
tube constituted "extraordinary" treatment and could therefore be withdrawn under the informal mechanisms of professional practice.88
Claire's condition and the precise nature of her treatment answered most
of the ethical questions. The medical community was less concerned
with how a decision to withdraw treatment should be made, than with
the significance of issues such as the degree of competence or type of care
89
facility.
Legally, the issues were framed in different terms. While the central
issue was the same-whether Claire's condition warranted granting the
request to remove her feeding tube-the language of rights dominated
87. The court distinguished Quinlan on the facts because unlike Karen Quinlan, Claire
Conroy was not comatose or vegetative, and was in a nursing home rather than a hospital. Id.
at 374, 486 A.2d at 1236. The court would not have approved removal of the feeding tube in
this case because Ms. Conroy did not meet the tests for allowing treatment to be withdrawn.
This was not relevant, since Ms. Conroy had died by the time the court rendered its decision.
The court did find, however, that removal of the feeding tube, would not constitute "active
euthanasia" if the other criteria were met. Id. at 378-86, 486 A.2d at 1239-43.
88. Id. at 346-56, 486 A.2d at 1221-27. Doctors were uncertain about whether she experienced pain, and this became an issue in the legal culture's resolution of the issues; this was
inevitable given the current state of scientific knowledge about noncognitive pain and the process of dying. The characterization of procedures as "extraordinary" has a specific meaning in
medical culture; informal mechanisms within accepted professional practice do permit withdrawal of "extraordinary" treatment under certain circumstances. T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHiLDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 126-27, 130 (2d ed. 1983); Hastings Center
Research Group, Guidelinesfor Research, Development, and Delivery of Life-Extending Technologies, in LIFE SPAN: VALUES AND LIFE-EXTENDING TECHNOLOGIES 70-75 (R. Veatch ed.
1987).
89. There was, of course, a strong desire to have the courts resolve the issue in such a way
as to absolve the medical community of potential criminal or civil liability. But the medical
community has been slow to recognize, for instance, that nursing homes need more stringent
scrutiny and regulation than do hospitals, or that nursing home residents might need special
protection from medical professionals. B. VLADECK, UNLOVING CARE: THE NURSING
HOME TRAGEDY (1980).
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the discussion. The key legal issues were whether the right to die included so-called affirmative acts that will hasten death and whether a
substitute consenter has the same right to make decisions as a patient. In
this analysis, it became necessary to determine the appropriate standard
for making a substitute decision and for choosing a substitute decisionmaker.90
The court then tried to reconcile the requirements of the legal decision-making process with the realities of implementation in the medical
and social service community. After Quinlan, the Conroy court presumed that the right-to-die was a privacy right that incorporated a right
to withdraw treatment. The court also considered a feeding tube comparable to a respirator. At this point, however, the Court diverged from
the Quinlan rationale. If a person is not competent to make the decision
to withdraw treatment, the court said that a substitute decision-maker
should determine what an individual would do if competent and autonomous. 91 Moreover, it recognized that the right to bodily integrity, including the right to consent to or to refuse medical intervention, should
92
be respected.
The crux of the court's decision, however, was more complex. To
differentiate its application of self-determination from the best interests
doctrine used in Quinlan, the Conroy court imposed three alternative
tests for deciding whether life support treatment could be withdrawn,
with an individual's current condition and prior state of mind determining which test to use. First, a subjective test is applied when there is
clear evidence that an individual would have chosen to withdraw treatment-a living will, a clear oral directive, or a durable power of attorney. 93 The subjective test tries to ascertain, through evidentiary
procedures, what a person's actual wishes would be if he was competent.
90. "Rights" in this context cover a panoply of life-relevant factors: a right to determine,
demand, or refuse treatment; a right to die; and a right to remove artificial impediments to
carrying out those wishes (such as a feeding tube or respirator). As noted earlier, however, the
concept of rights is awkward to articulate in this context, particularly as a monolithic frame-

work. See D.

CALLAHAN, THE TYRANNY OF SURVIVAL

256-57 (1973); sources cited supra

note 6.
91. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 356, 486 A.2d at 1227.
92. d at 360, 486 A.2d at 1229.
93. The court indicated that it might have been wrong in not applying this test in Quinlan, because subjective evidence seems to have existed. Id at 362, 486 A.2d at 1230.
In addition to subjective evidence, medical evidence bearing on physical condition and
prognosis was necessary: severe and permanent mental and physical impairment and a lifeexpectancy of one year or less. It is not clear why the court considered medical evidence to be
crucial, except possibly to -elaborate on the record what the patient's state of self-knowledge
would have been. Subjective evidence might also be deduced from a person's religious beliefs
or a consistent prior pattern of conduct. Id at 363, 486 A.2d at 1230.
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If the evidence is insufficient to meet the subjective test, the court
propounded the use of two additional tests, in which best interests becomes an element of self-determination through substitute consent. The
second test is a "limited objective" test and is used if there is some trustworthy evidence of what a person would have chosen (but, insufficient to
meet the subjective test). This test also requires strong medical evidence
that the burdens of the patient's life with the treatment clearly outweigh
the benefits of life, and that continued treatment would merely prolong
suffering. 94 The third test, a "pure objective" test, would be used in the
absence of any evidence of an individual's specific will. Because there is
no testamentary evidence, the medical evidence must be compelling; not
only must the burdens of continued treatment outweigh the benefits of
continued life, but there must be a clear finding that the recurring, unavoidable, and severe pain of the patient's life are such that continued
treatment would be inhumane. 95
Applying the new analysis to the case, the court found that evidence
of Claire's expressed aversion to doctors and treatment was insufficient to
meet either the subjective test or the limited objective test. She failed to
meet the pure objective test as well because the court found that her lack
of cognitive function, coupled with her non-comatose state, precluded
scientific agreement on her ability to experience pain.96 The court also
expressed concern that nursing home residents like Claire were particu94. Id. at 366, 486 A.2d 1232. The last two tests raise utilitarian considerations that
sharply contrast the individualistic orientation of the self-determination model. This suggests
that even within a liberal orientation there is some degree of tension. That is, as soon as one
steps outside the realm of self-determination and individual will, communitarian ideology assumes a greater role. This, of course, is one of the ironies of liberalism. See generally B.
ACKERMAN, supra note 41, at 342-48 (using the concept of neutral dialogue to describe the
liberal construction of community, in which social dependence is subordinated to the "dialogic
processes of neutral conversation."); M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE xiv (1983) (describing
the concept of distributive justice as encompassing a shared understanding of social goods). It
is also, however, a tension that is at the heart of many of the bioethical debates. See J. CHILDRESS, WHO SHOULD DECIDE?

(1982). The artificiality of re-creating "will" through a substi-

tuted consent process may necessitate a pluralistic focus.
95. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232. Expressly excluded under these tests are
quality-of-life or social utility considerations. The court also stated that the primary focus of
any third-party decision-making should be the patient's desires and her experience of pain or
burden, and not on the type of treatment. Finally, as a corollary to these tests, if neither
express subjective evidence nor objective medical evidence exists, treatment could not be withdrawn. Presumably these considerations could be valid under the subjective test if there was
testamentary evidence concerning them, as would subjective evidence of a desire to be treated
regardless of prognosis or burdens. The court did not accept the medical distinction between
"ordinary" and "extraordinary" treatment, or between "actively" hastening death by withdrawing treatment and "passively" allowing a person to die by not initiating treatment.
96. Id. at 386, 486 A.2d at 1243.

November 19881

RIGHT TO DIE

larly vulnerable to institutional abuse, and it therefore required that all
requests for withdrawal of treatment be referred initially to the state's
97
Nursing Home Ombudsman.
The Conroy decision proceduralized the issue, and complicated
right-to-die decision-making. First, the decision curtailed the role of
medical and social service institutions by substituting a judicial, quasijudicial, or administrative body such as a court or ombudsman. The
Quinlan court had indicated its approval of hospital ethics committees as
decision-makers. 98 The Conroy court, however, did not adopt a comparable procedure; rather, decisions to withdraw treatment from nursing
home patients were to be made by a guardian ad litem, under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, and only after a judicial determination of the
patient's incompetence. 99 Second, the tests were inflexible and inefficient
to administer; Claire Conroy herself did not fit any of the guidelines. 100
Finally, the decision is of limited precedential value because the court

specifically did not extend its application to persons in other situations,
such as severely disabled premature infants; retarded persons who have
never been competent and who are therefore without a "baseline" from
which to deduce will; or competent, non-terminal but severely disabled
persons.101
In summary, the Conroy opinion clarified the interaction of medical
and legal cultures and the way in which the professions perceive nonautonomous persons. The three tests propounded by the court were an attempt to address both the vulnerability of the patient population and the
97. Id. at 382-83, 486 A.2d at 1241.
98. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 54, 355 A.2d 647, 671, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v.
New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
99. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 374-83, 486 A.2d at 1237-41.
100. The court found that the evidence of aversion of physicians and hospitals was not a
sufficiently clear showing of intent for the subjective test and, while that evidence would have
been sufficient for either of the objective tests, there was insufficient evidence concerning the
burdens and benefits of continued life, because of the uncertainty of scientific knowledge regarding the experience of pain. Id. at 386-87, 486 A.2d at 1243. Thus the very tests designed
to alleviate suffering could prolong a terminal illness.
It is not clear that the other stated goal of the tests-that of protecting vulnerable persons
from abuse by family or medical personnel-would be met by the Conroy system. The
Ombudsman requirement applies to patients in Claire Conroy's position, semi-vegetative and
in nursing homes. In contrast, patients in Karen Quinlan's position, young, comatose and
hospitalized, presumably continued to come under the guidelines established in Quinlan. See
supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text. Moreover, there is some limited evidence to the
effect that the Conroy rules were not followed in subsequent cases. See Comment, The Role of
the Family, supra note 35, at 345-49.
101. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 360-61, 486 A.2d at 1229. Again, the court expressed its view that
these issues should be considered by the court primarily on a case-by-case basis, and that
legislative standards should be implemented.
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nature of decisions made by care providers. Thus, the court tried to preserve self-determination by erecting a procedural shield in order to recreate the state of mind of a nonautonomous person. By replacing the
best interests doctrine with procedure, however, the decisional model
was difficult to implement. The idea of autonomy that emerges from
Conroy is illusory because the underlying legal culture is artificial and
temporary. Judicial decisions must be implemented by families and care
providers. Protective services mechanisms, such as the Ombudsman, are
necessary present-day protectors of the vulnerable, but the decision in
Conroy seems to imply that these mechanisms will replace informal family and social networks. In fact, like Quinlan, the rationale in Conroy
relies on a reactive decision-making process that must be initiated by a
party-the person involved, or a family, or community-with legal
standing to raise questions about treatment. 0 2 Neither case suggests a
decisional structure for individuals in similar situations, suffering and
without autonomy, but without a voice that can be heard.
E. The Farrell-Peter-JobesTrilogy
Implementation of the mechanisms set forth in Conroy did not resolve the right-to-die issues. The tests, which were limited to fact situations that closely paralleled Conroy, could not be applied easily to other
cases. In June 1987, the court faced the question of withdrawal of treatment again, this time in a trilogy of cases-In re Farrell,103 In re Peter,104
and In re Jobes.10 5 These cases differed from the facts in Quinlan and
Conroy and in each case, the court found the Conroy tests inapplicable.
Although Conroy had been decided just two years prior, the court devised yet another variation on the interplay of best interests and selfdetermination doctrines.
The three opinions should be read together as a full reassessment of
the issues. Once again, the court addressed the relationship between
legal and medical cultures and the role of the judiciary in mediating between them. Having apparently recognized the limitations of the conflict-resolving procedures it had previously established, the court tried to
ascertain the appropriate procedural mechanisms for deciding this social
issue. Despite its attempt, however, the trilogy left unresolved numerous
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987).
108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
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inchoate issues. The court also expressed concern about addressing issues
10 6
such as these through an adversary format.
The facts of these cases differed in significant ways from the earlier
decisions. Kathleen Farrell was a competent, terminally ill adult, living
at home, who sought to have her respirator disconnected. The court was
asked to give practical effect to its assertion that "competent informed
patients have the right to decline life-sustaining treatment."10 7 Hilda Peter was a sixty-five year old nursing home resident who, while competent,
had executed a durable power of attorney that clearly indicated her antipathy to permanent artificial life-support.108 Nancy Ellen Jobes was a
thirty-one year old nursing home resident. Before her accident she had
stated a desire not to have extraordinary life-support procedures; however, these statements had been made under what the court termed "casual" circumstances and were considered unreliable. Therefore, she did
not meet the requirements of the subjective test of Conroy, and her physical condition was not grave enough to meet either of its alternative objective tests. Moreover, because she was a resident of a nursing home and
not a hospital, she did not meet the prerequisites set forth in Quinlan.
The opinions in these cases reflected a hybrid ideology that incorporated elements of both the best interests and the self-determination doctrines and gives considerable deference to the state interests.
Additionally, the court moved away from a rigid application of procedure to a mechanism that incorporated family, community, and professional values. Self-determination once again became part of the decisionmaking process, but from the perspective of the community.
(1) In re Farrell
In In re Farrell, the court did not decide whether life-sustaining
treatment could be withdrawn, but rather, who could make such a decision, and how it should be made. 10 9 It also clarified the protected individual interests: the common-law right to refuse treatment and the
106. Farrell, 108 N.J. at 341, 529 A.2d at 408 (quoting In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 344-45,
486 A.2d 1209, 1219-20 (1985)). The court noted that the medical and technological advances
have turned what formerly were matters of fate into matters of choice raising profound moral,
social, technological, philosophical, and legal questions involving the interplay of many
disciplines.
107. Id. at 342, 529 A.2d at 408.
108. In re Peter by Johanning, 108 N.J. 364, 364-65, 529 A.2d 419, 419 (1987). Her condition, however, differed in two ways from Claire Conroy: she was comatose, but her physical
condition was considered good, and her life expectancy was not limited to the "one year or

less" standard expressed in Conroy. The Ombudsman had therefore rejected her guardian's
request to remove her feeding tube.
109.

Farrell,108 N.J. at 345, 529 A.2d at 409.
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constitutional privacy interest.' 10 Again, however, these interests were
balanced against the potential state interests.
Kathleen Farrell was competent and fully aware of the meaning of
her decision. She authorized her husband to act as her guardian, but she
also had two minor children. Thus the state, in its parenspatriae role as
protector of the welfare of the children, arguably had a significantly
greater interest in preventing the withdrawal of treatment. The court
therefore examined closely the state interests it had articulated earlier in
both Quinlan and Conroy."1 '
First, the court viewed the state's indirect and abstract interest in
preserving the life of a competent person as generally subordinate to the
patient's much stronger personal interest in directing the course of her
own life. 112 The court found that the state's second interest, in preventing suicide, was motivated by, if not encompassed within, its interest in
preserving life. That interest, while individualistic, was seen as an expression of the state's interest in preserving the good of the community.
The court found that refusing life-support treatment did not amount to
an attempt to commit suicide and that the integrity of the medical profes11 3
sion would be appropriately safeguarded.
The only state interest that the court found to be compelling was the
state's interest in protecting third parties who might be harmed by the
court's decision. The court had appointed a guardian ad litem to protect
the interests of Kathleen Farrell's two teenage sons. The guardian concluded that the children would not be harmed if the requested relief was
granted. The court agreed that this was not an instance in which treatment could be forced upon a parent whose prospects for recovery were
good and whose death would threaten a child's well-being. The primacy
of the family was a linchpin of the court's reasoning. Although the decision upheld the individual rights position by granting Kathleen Farrell's
request, it did so after concluding that the rights of the community-in
4
this case, her family-would not be harmed."I
110. Id. at 346, 529 A.2d at 410.
111. Id. at 348-53, 529 A.2d at 410-13.
112. Id. at 349, 529 A.2d at 411 (quoting In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 348-49, 486 A.2d
1209, 1223 (1985)). Kathleen Farrell was competent, so the issue of substitute consent was not
present; the court was simply concerned that she was "properly informed about her prognosis,
the alternative treatments available, and the risk involved in the withdrawal of the life-sustaining treatment." Id. at 348, 529 A.2d at 415.
113. Id. at 349-50, 529 A.2d at 411-12 (citing Conroy and cases decided in other jurisdictions); see also POLICY STATEMENT OF THE NEW JERSEY STATE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS ON DECISIONS TO WITHHOLD OR WITHDRAW MEDICAL TREATMENT 1-2 (July 1986).
114. "Where the evidence reveals a close, loving family like the Farrells, we presume that
when the parents make medical decisions, they are concerned about and will protect their
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The court noted that the law traditionally respects the private realm
of family life and that respect for and confidence in the family should
ground judicial doctrine. It, therefore, found that a person's place of
confinement-at home, like Kathleen Farrell, or in a hospital or nursing
home-should not limit consideration of the choices and should not restrict or burden a person who chooses to remain at home.1 1 5 Accordingly, in the case of a competent person, the court viewed judicial review
as unnecessary in all cases. Instead, the court required that in addition
to the attending physician, two physicians must examine the patient to
confirm that the objective requirements (similar to those outlined in Conroy) have been met. 116 The independent confirmation would satisfy questions that might later arise about the propriety of withholding or
withdrawing treatment. In addition, this procedure would forestall hasty
decisions that might be made while a patient was emotionally disturbed. 117 Because Kathleen Farrell died before the court's decision, this
procedural approach for implementing the decision of a competent person was never tested.
By requiring confirmation of the objective requirements by three
physicians, the court returned to the best interests doctrine, by resting
both the state interests and individual rights on a third party's understanding of best interests. From an opinion proscribing the decisional
structure for a competent person, the court turned to a case that came
even closer to the facts of Conroy. But the court used its reapplication of
best interests doctrine to reject the procedural approach it had adopted in
Conroy.
(2) In re Peter
The facts in the case of Hilda Peter closely resembled Claire Conroy's, although a potentially longer life-expectancy had led the
children's interests ...[and thus] a guardian ad litem is ...unnecessary

..." Farrell,108
N.J. at 353, 529 A.2d at 413.
115. Id. at 354-55, 529 A.2d at 414-15.
116. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
117. Farrell,108 N.J. at 355, 529 A.2d at 415. The court also noted here that this procedure would protect the patient from harms that arise from inadequacies-such as a temporary
emotional instability-that might themselves diminish the value of self-determination. Again,
the value of communally-mandated decisions is deemed important. In any event, however, the
objectivity requirement must be met-physicians must be satisfied that the person is competent, informed about the prognosis and the medical alternatives, and has not been coerced into
reaching a decision. This rationale has been supported in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., In re
Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d
266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); see also Note, In re Storar: The Right to Die and
Incompetent Patients,43 U. PiTt. L. REV. 1087 (1982) (authored by Carol Ann Colabrese).
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Ombudsman to refuse her guardian's request to withdraw life support.-II
Initially, the court returned to the analysis it had used in Quinlan. Once
again, the court did not consider the life-expectancy of a person in a
persistent vegetative state to be an important criterion in determining
whether life-sustaining treatment could be withdrawn. Noting that lifeexpectancy analyses usually assume that there are at least some benefits
to be derived from the continued existence of an incompetent but minimally functioning person, the court found this assumption inappropriate
in the case of a person, like Hilda Peter, who was comatose.1 19
The court then addressed the procedural tests that it had enunciated
in Conroy. The function of the two objective tests was to balance the
benefits of continued life against the pain and suffering that a person
would feel as a result of continued treatment. Even for marginally cognitive patients like Claire Conroy, however, it is often difficult or impossible to measure the burdens of embarrassment, frustration, and other
emotional pain, or the benefits of enjoyable feelings. Medical experts
cannot determine with any certainty a nonverbal, incompetent person's
level of intellectual functioning, depth of emotional life, or experience of
0
physical or emotional pain. 12
Therefore, the court found that this would
be an impossible requirement to apply to a comatose patient. 121 For persons in a comatose state, the court held that: "The interested parties need
not have clear and convincing evidence of the patient's intentions; they
need only 'render their best judgment' as to what medical decision the
patient would want them to make."' 12 2
Hilda Peter had left clear instructions regarding her objection to ar118. In re Peter by Johanning, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
119. Id. at 374-76, 529 A.2d at 421-22.
120. Id. at 395-96, 529 A.2d 431 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). The court's reliance on a person's ability to experience pain has been criticized. See In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 322, 340
(Minn. 1984); see also Deciding to Forego Life Sustaining Treatment, in 1 PRESIDENT's COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 135; Comment, Rx for the Elderly: Legal Rights (and
Wrongs) Within the Health Care System, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 425, 466 (1985).
121. Peter, 108 N.J. at 376-77, 529 A.2d at 425. This analysis is somewhat confusing

because it makes application of the objective tests contingent on tenuous variations in physical
condition. People like Claire Conroy, marginally cognitive, must meet the benefit and burdens
test while comatose people like Hilda Peter will be subject to the best interests test of Quinlan:
"[I]f the guardian and family... conclude that the patient would not want to be sustained by
life-supporting treatment, and the attending physician agrees,.... and both the attending physician and the hospital prognosis committee verify the patient's medical condition ... [treatment may be withdrawn.]" Id. at 377, 529 A.2d at 425 (citing In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41,
355 A.2d 647, 664, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976)).
122. Id. The court also cautioned that these decisions might conceivably allow withdrawal of treatment from senile patients and victims of Alzheimer's disease. The court further
noted, however, that these patients are likely to have some minimal functioning and would
therefore fall under the Conroy rationale.
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tificial life support. Therefore, the court held that the subjective test it
had articulated in Conroy should be applied. 123 It extended the use of

that test to every refusal-of-treatment case, regardless of the patient's
condition or life expectancy. 124 But for persistently vegetative or comatose patients who do not leave instructions sufficient to meet the subjective test, self-determination gives way to a formulation of the best
interests doctrine in which the community's values prevail.1 25 These issues-the continuing tension between self-determination and best interests, between individual rights and community values-were again

considered in the Jobes opinion.
(3) In re Jobes
The Jobes decision 126 clarifies how the revised decision-making procedures should be applied to comatose nursing home residents. Nancy

Jobes' situation was marginally different from the others. Medically, she
was comatose, like Karen Quinlan and Hilda Peter. Unlike those two,
she was in a nursing home and not a hospital. Like Hilda Peter, her life
expectancy potentially exceeded the one-year criterion articulated in
Conroy; however, Nancy Ellen Jobes was not elderly. Additionally, she
had not articulated opposition to permanent artificial life-support, and
although the court found that there was "some" trustworthy evidence of
127
such a desire, she did not meet the subjective test of Conroy.
Because this case was subtly different from the others, neither Quin-

lan nor Conroy were apposite. Additionally, due to the unique problems
involved in surrogate decision-making, the court held that the Conroy
balancing tests did not apply.12 8 The court, therefore, once again out123. Id. at 377, 529 A.2d at 425.
124. Under that test life-sustaining treatment may be withdrawn or withheld whenever
there is clear and convincing proof of the patient's wishes. Moreover, once the subjective test
is met, the balance between the patient's life expectancy and the benefits and burdens of continued life is no longer relevant, because the patient's right to self-determination overrides those
standards. Id. at 377-79, 529 A.2d at 429.
125. Id. at 379, 529 A.2d at 429. Reiterating its concern about the vulnerability of nursing
home residents, the court outlined procedures that would have to be applied before life-sustaining treatment could be withdrawn. The Nursing Home Ombudsman retains ultimate responsibility for implementing withdrawal-of-treatment procedures. Before treatment can be
withdrawn, the Ombudsman must secure two independent confirmations of the patient's condition. If there is already an appointed guardian, the Ombudsman may then defer the decision
to the guardian; otherwise, the Ombudsman must first ascertain whether there is a close friend
or family member who can serve as a surrogate decision-maker and, if not, must ask that an
independent guardian be appointed. Id. at 384, 529 A.2d at 425-26.
126. 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
127. Id. at 419, 529 A.2d at 443.
128. Id. at 420, 529 A.2d at 443.
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lined ground-breaking procedures. It declined to apply the rigidly structured procedures of Conroy, and shifted to the more flexible best interests
test of Quinlan. After weighing the potential state interests, the court
found that these interests weaken as the degree of medical invasion increases and the prognosis becomes poorer. Therefore, when there is no
clear and convincing evidence of a person's will, "the only practical way
to prevent destruction [of the right to refuse treatment is] to permit a
129
substitute decision-maker to render their best judgment."
(4) The Mystique of the Best Interests Doctrine
The trilogy of cases resolved many of the conflicts that had been left
open by the Quinlan and Conroy courts. The cases, however, raise further ideological concerns about how to implement decision-making procedures and how best interests doctrine is balanced with the right to
individual self-determination for nonautonomous persons. The opinions
make clear a dilemma which none of the decisional doctrines adequately
answer. All of these cases involve people who are nonautonomous, but
who have active, caring communities-families, lovers, professionals who
know them-to assist the decision-making process. The court consistently included these communities in its description of decision-making.
But for non-connected individuals who are also nonautonomous-nevercompetent individuals, or individuals who have no close family or
friends-the court's solution is inadequate. 130 Many of these people will
reach a point where the only possible substitute decision-maker is a
court-appointed guardian who has no personal knowledge of their
wishes. They might become the victims of subtle abuses. Because nonconnected people might not meet the tests that the cases enunciated, they
129. Id. at 414, 529 A.2d at 444 (emphasis added). The court used the term "substituted
judgment," citing Quinlan and Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment, in 1 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 174-75. The appropriate decision-maker
should be a family member or close friend "not only because of their peculiar grasp of the
patient's approach to life, but because of their special bonds with the patient." Jobes, 108 N.J.
at 416, 529 A.2d at 445. In such instances, an independent guardian need not be appointed
unless a "health care professional" becomes concerned that family members are not protecting
a patient's interests. In Quinlan and Peter, approval by the hospital ethics committee was
required before withdrawal of treatment could be carried out. Such a committee does not exist
in most nursing homes; therefore the court required the substitute decision-maker to secure the
consent of two independent physicians. See infra text accompanying note 175 for a further
discussion of ethics committees.
130. Jobes, 108 N.J. at 428, 529 A.2d at 449. Advances in medical technology also save
lives of persons who are poor, elderly, disabled, or members of other minority groups, whose
social circumstances make them marginal members of society. Current demographic predictions suggest that the absence of community will be a serious problem for poor elderly persons
in the coming years. Siegel & Taeuber, supra note 11, at 99-107.
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may be "abused" by a well-meaning procedure that does not allow lifeprolonging treatment to be terminated. On the other hand, implementation of best interests doctrine might bring about a legislative standard
that incorporates communitarian interests; again threatening self-determination. Before further addressing the potential consequences of these
decisions, it is appropriate to consider some alternative standards for decision-making that have been proposed outside of the courtroom.
IIM.

Setting Limits: The Role of Community

As judges, legislators, medical professionals, and ethicists have
sought to agree upon a structure to decide right-to-die issues, they have
begun to examine "how much" treatment is "enough" and "how long" a
life is "too long." To date, the decision-making structures employed in
the context of social or family conflict-those based in doctrines of selfdetermination and best interests-have ruled judicial and legislative decisions in this area. These approaches have proved to be less than satisfactory, however, for setting broad policies. Repeatedly, one is left with a
sense of consternation, as courts and legislatures struggle to reach conclusions that are only partial cures. Of deeper concern is the large and
growing category of persons for which the precedential value of these
judicial opinions will be minimal-non-connected people for whom the
concept of "community" is meaningless or entirely artificial. Meanwhile,
hospitals and health care providers, as well as families, struggle to cope
with ad hoc provisions. In this context, some master plan or broad legislative policy approach is increasingly attractive.
Recently, two ethicists who are concerned with policy issues, Daniel
Callahan and E.G. Emanuel, have suggested alternatives to the morass of
legal intricacy and medical uncertainty that has so far defined the terms
of the debate.13 1 Both Callahan's scheme and Emanuel's proposal address withdrawal or denial of treatment using communitarian standards
for making decisions that might otherwise be based upon individualistic
ideas about legal rights. Both depart from the traditional decision-making doctrines of individual "best interests" and "self-determination," in
favor of a formulation that highlights shared social norms and community ideology. In contrast, Joel Handler, a lawyer and social scientist
who writes extensively about problems of the disabled and disadvantaged, has examined several forums in which another model of communi132
tarian ideology has refocused traditionally rigid decision-making.
131.

D.

132.

J. HANDLER, supra note 4.

CALLAHAN,

supra note 3; Emanuel, supra note 17.
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This model makes a conscious attempt to construct a social community
within a social services system.
A.

Callahan: Communitarian Limits Beyond a "Natural" Life Span

In Setting Limits: Medical Goals In An Aging Society, 13 3 Daniel Callahan criticizes the presumption that the infirm elderly should always
receive the benefits of dramatic medical treatment and technology. Callahan proposes a subjective ideology of treatment based upon a construct
of age that is not exclusively chronological or biological. 134 The standard
would begin by assessing what the appropriate goal of medicine should
be for persons who have lived a "natural span," and whether advances in
medical technology should alter the process of making decisions about
death. Callahan's substitute standard assumes the following principles:
(1) Society has a duty to help people live out a "natural" life span, but it
does not have an obligation to help extend life beyond that point; (2)
society is obliged to develop, employ, and pay for only that kind and
degree of life-extending medical technology necessary to achieve a "natural" life span; and (3) beyond the "natural" life span, society should provide only those resources necessary to alleviate suffering, not to extend
life. 135

Callahan does not inquire whether technology exists that can save
lives, but whether society is obligated to use the technology once the natural span has passed. In his view, the goal of medical treatment for elderly people should be to relieve suffering rather than to arbitrarily extend
life, and objective standards should be designed that would allow a calculation of the "natural" life span. The ease with which the standard might
be implemented, however, particularly in a society that is increasingly
concerned about scarce resources, raises serious concerns. 136 Under this
analysis, the "do no harm" mystique of the medical profession might
remain unchanged, but in practice medical norms of care could be significantly altered.
Callahan's scheme rests on a foundation of "obligations" of society
or government. The suggestion that the government has an affirmative
obligation to support life-and hence to provide services-within the
133. D. CALLAHAN, supra note 3. Mr. Callahan is Director of The Hastings Center, an
institute devoted to the study of ethical issues in scientific and biomedical research.
134. See the factors described by OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS,
BIOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS PROGRAM,

LIFE SUSTAINING TECHNOLOGIES AND THE ELD-

(1987).
135. D. CALLAHAN, supra note 3, at 222-23.

ERLY

136.

See The Community Health Decisions Movement, 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP. Spe-

cial Supp. (1988).
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"normal" life span is a progressive formulation and would mandate a
more humane provision of long-term care and catastrophic services than
are provided presently. It is also controversial, as the recent congressional negotiations over even a minimal catastrophic health insurance for
the elderly have shown. 137 If, however, the construct obligates society to
provide care for some but not all, it leaves open the issue of whether
anyone would be permitted to purchase additional care. Would care beyond the "normal" span of life be available on the open market? If so,
the existing economic inequities in the health care system would con-

tinue. The most serious critique of Callahan's theory, however, is that it
would return almost sole discretion in decision-making about treatment
of elderly persons to medical professionals because, ultimately, these pro-

fessionals would shape the combination of normative factors-medical,
chronological, and social-that characterize the "natural" span.
A "quality-of-life" standard without age-based criteria might be a

more workable way of assessing medical care. Callahan's premise-that
the goal of medical care is to restore and maintain an adequate quality of
life, and not to extend a deteriorating life-need not be limited by age

factors. Moreover, present civil rights laws prohibit discrimination on
the basis of age or physical disability. 138 The Older American's Act of
1965139 prohibits discrimination on the basis of age, as does the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 140 While these do not specifically apply
to medical care, courts have looked closely at discrimination based upon
age-related disabilities.14 1 Protections for discrimination against handicapped or disabled persons is even more clearly delineated in federal and
state law. 142
137. See generally Medicare Catastrophic Illness Coverage Act of 1988 Pub. L. No. 100361, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (102 Stat. 683) 803 (providing long term nursing home and hospital care to medicare recipients). See also 134 CONG. REc. 12,043 (1988)
(statement by McCain, supporting S. 1738, proposed legislation to make long term health care
available to federal employees).
138. See generally Avorn, Benefits and Cost Analysis in Geriatric Care: TurningAge DiscriminationInto Health Policy, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1249 (1984).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 3001 (1982).
140. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1982).
141. See, eg., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Mugia, 427 U.S. 307, 317 (1976) (Marshall, L., dissenting). Many states have passed protective legislation. See CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 12940 et seq. (West 1980 & Supp. 1984); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512 et seq. (1981 & Supp.
1983); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 111.31 etseq. (West 1974 & Supp. 1983-84).
142. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982); Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1982). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides, in pertinent part, that "no otherwise qualified individual... shall, solely by
reason of his handicap, be excluded from participation in, denied benefit of, or be subject to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance." This provision was used by the Department of Health and Human Services in an attempt to require
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Callahan's apparent willingness to abandon an ideology of care that
incorporates individuals, community, and family into the decision-making process raises more serious concerns. The implication that responsibility for treatment decisions should rest within the medical profession
does not address the need for a decisional system that incorporates selfdetermination and social autonomy, or an objective ideology of fairness.
Thus, the standard is communitarian only in the broadest sense-the
"community" is essentially the medical community. The professional
choices, however, would be influenced through a community model legislated by balancing economic and social costs and benefits. The affected
individuals, the elderly who have lived a "normal span" are absent from
the model. Undoubtedly, malpractice suits, and the fear of malpractice,
would force some self-regulation upon medical professionals, these concerns alone, however, would not insure the protection of the most vulnerable, those persons who are without a community to advise them and
who might be unaware that their interests are not well-served. Even a
benevolent cost and benefit scheme is a high price to pay for building
objectively more "humane" standards of care into norms of professional
discretion.
B.

Emanuel: Majoritarian Standards

In A Communal Vision of Care for Incompetent Patients,14 3 E.J.
Emanuel proposed a communitarian standard for determining when life
support should not be proffered. In this model, which is premised on the
existence of a multi-faceted, pluralistic society, the standard of care for
severely ill persons would be derived from the "deliberation" of a particular community through a majoritarian "community-federated" process.
The case-by-case character of decisions using both best interests and selfdetermination doctrines would be abandoned in favor of a model in
which social consent would be an integral component of health care decisions for elderly people. While Callahan's model excludes the democratic ideology of community, Emanuel's highlights it. Callahan relies
on professional discretion rather than democracy. Emanuel, on the other
hand, envisions a communitarian model that is purely majoritarian.
life-sustaining treatment of severely-disabled newborns in the now-famous "Baby Doe" litigation. Bowen v. American Hosp. Assoc., 476 U .S. 610 (1986). Many states also have protective legislation. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.10 (West Supp. 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 1401,4-03 to 4-06, 14-02, 4-08 (1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (Anderson 1984);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-103-104 (1979); see also U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES, Ch. 2 (1983).
143. Emanuel, supra note 17. Professor Emanuel is a Fellow in Harvard University's pro-

gram on Ethics in the Professions.
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Emanuel objects to the way in which the best interests standard is
presently incorporated into medical decision-making, but not because it
denies individuals their right to self-determination.144 Emanuel's underlying critique examines the composition of society rather than the dimensions of the legal standard itself. In a homogeneous society, there is no
need to articulate explicitly objective socially shared criteria, because a
shared view of the meaning and purpose of life allows patients and physicians to agree on what is best for the patient, how decisions should be
made, and who should make them. 145 Emanuel contends, however, that
the values of modem society are based on pluralism-and that there is no
objective standard of what is good, right, or moral.146 He concludes by
suggesting that because publicly enunciated criteria are necessary in order to reestablish community standards, a "community-federated" system of standards for removing or refusing treatment should be enacted
by local communities or, in large urban areas, by individual hospitals,
health care plans, clinics, and similar units.1 47
Despite its appeal as a pluralistic standard that incorporates current
social mores, Emanuel's proposal contains a serious flaw. It assumes that
within the pluralistic society, locally-constructed communities would
also share pluralistic values. But the point of the community-federated
standard approach is that each community would legislate its own social
values. Additionally, it is unlikely that a true "local community" exists
anywhere in present society; most communities are to some degree artificially constructed. The nature of a pluralistic society does not mean that
local "community-federated" standards would be pluralistic; in fact they
could well be exclusionary.1 48 It would not be difficult for some individuals to form their exclusive "local communities" with economic resources
as a criterion for membership, while others whose resources are limited
would be confined to a geographical community with less advantageous
standards. Moreover, there is no guarantee that community-federated
standards would be equitable across "community" boundaries; again,
144. Id at 16.
145. Id
146. Id
147. Id at 18-19.
148. For example, the Supreme Court attempted, with little success, to mandate legislation
of community standards for obscenity, in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slayton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
The result has been a confusing morass of judicial decisions. See Lynn, "Civil Rights" Ordinancesand the Attorney General'sCommission: New Developments in PornographyRegulation,
21 HARv. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 27, 32-37; Note, Taking Serious Values Seriously: Obscenity,
Pope v. Illinois, and an Objective Standard, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 855, 859-61 (1987) (authored by Susan Elkin).
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this notion raises constitutional questions of equity as well as moral and
political questions of fairness and resource allocation.
More disturbing, however, are the unanswered questions. Who
within "local communities" would promulgate and carry out the decisions? Should such decisions really be subject to what is essentially majority rule? What will be the effect of federal laws or regulations, such as
provisions that forbid discrimination against the elderly or disabled, or
national health policies that provide for universal care when particular
criteria are met?1 49 Finally, what of the millions of people without a selfselected community, those who might be present in a community by accident or because they have no advocate to assist them in choosing a community? For such people, the idea of "community-federated" standards
is no different from the traditional medical-model best interests standard,
with a utilitarian cast.
C. Handler: Social Autonomy in a Pluralistic Society
Joel Handler has coined the term "social autonomy" to describe the
relationship of the citizen to the state in the context of particular kinds of
discretionary decisions involving dependent persons.' 50 According to
Handler, social autonomy contains a pluralistic definition of community
as a dialogue in which each of the participants is reciprocally aware of
the state of consciousness of the other participants. This view of pluralism complements or completes individualism. 15 1 Decisions are made
through a collaborative interaction, with the decision-maker exercising
broad discretionary powers. 152 Discretion is achieved through negotiation and is not simply a condition of bureaucratic administrative process.
The concept of social autonomy contains a definition of the role, rights,
and duties of individuals that incorporates mediative methodology and
attention to implementation, rather than structured, adversarial, or paternalistic decision-making.
Handler questions the tradition of "liberal legalism," as the basic
paradigm of the legal system; this system "posits the individual protected
in a zone of freedom by a bundle of legal rights."'' 53 He suggests that
society has realized that there are limits on the legal rights revolution's
149. Medicare and Medicaid, for instance, as well as current policies relating to kidney
dialysis.
150. J. HANDLER, supra note 4, at 14.
151. Handler further develops the concept in the final chapter, "Social Autonomy." Id. at
263-65, 303-04.
152. Id. at 10-11.

153. Handler's model of discretion is constructed out of four bodies of theory: (1) public
policy implementation; (2) organizational or bureaucratic theory; (3) social movement re-
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ability to protect dependent people, particularly when decision-makers
use law and procedure to structure rather than to decide substantive issues in areas that are considered to be beyond regulation, such as welfare
and health care. 154 Handler therefore presents a critique of liberalism
from two perspectives: its tendency toward excessive egoism and artifi155
cial public/private distinctions, and the separation of fact from values.
Both of these criticisms address the perceived neutrality of the liberal
perspective.1 56 This dissatisfaction has manifested itself in the search for
a postmodern reconstruction of ethics, which seeks to define the human
in a social context as "a symmetric reciprocity between participants who
treat each other not as adversaries to be defeated but rather as partners in
a common conversational enterprise ... [that] allows for the construction of an ethic of citizenship."1 5 7 Much of Handler's critique of liberalism centers on the problem of how to reconstruct decision-making for
nonautonomous persons.
Handler explains the connection between the dialogical community--"the articulation of the relationship between self and others, autonomy and community"-and the idea that cooperation, trust, and
"seeking generalized interests rather than 'zero-sum' success"' 58 are values to be sought. These connections assume both an equality of resources and a process of exchange but ignores the fact that in most social
welfare relationships the individual is relatively powerless. Handler then
examines three novel programs that might form the basis for institutionalizing reciprocal relationships: informed consent in medical ethics, special education for handicapped children, and long-term care of the frail
elderly.
In the area of informed consent, Handler distinguishes between
"classic" informed consent-short-term acute situations such as surgery-and the situation of the chronically ill 59 While informed consent
is generally considered to be a failure in the acute situation, Handler suggests that chronically ill persons have become sophisticated over time
and that in addition to consenting to and accepting the medical recommendation, patients have time to understand and agree with the informasearch; and (4) the medical model of informed consent. Handler, Dependent People, supra note
18, at 3.
154. Id. at 1.
155. Id. at 62.
156. Id
157. Id. at 63.
158. Id at 65.
159. Id.; see also note 37 and accompanying text.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40

tion. Normally, through the reciprocal negotiation, "a rough equality of
160
resources begins to emerge.'
Handler then looks at the procedures established under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act. 16 I The Act sets up a system of
parental notification, formal hearings, and multi-disciplinary evaluations
before a child can be placed in special education classes. Normally, the
procedures for parental participation are not effective because "parents
lack the information and ability to deal with the school bureaucracy,"
and as a result the power relationship is vastly one-sided. 62 The
Madison, Wisconsin School District was able to alter the parent-agency
relationship by involving parents in both the diagnostic process and the
educational process, and by using a system of lay parent-advocates to
assist the parents through the process. Again, Handler points to success
163
through a process of negotiation.
Finally, Handler examines long-term care of the frail elderly. Here
he contrasts the present system of nursing home operation with a system
that highlights community living, suggesting that "a dialogical community" for the frail elderly might be found in a system of informal community care, which could be provided by family or friends, or by a structure
of social service agencies. 164 One operating premise of this system is the
inclusion of the individuals and their families as integral actors in the
service-delivery and decision-making processes. Once again, Handler's
discussion highlights the role of negotiation and cooperative clientagency relationships, rather than hierarchically structured relationships.
These examples lead Handler to conclude that a negotiative, rather
than a hierarchical, structure in service-delivery systems would allow decisions to be made that incorporate both the norms of the community
and the rights of the individual, without the constraint of proceduralized
decision-making. 165 This structure also posits a different form of communitarian ideology, one that is not imposed through professional
norms, and not "federated" through majoritarian process, but achieved
through a state of negotiation. In this structure, the doctrines of self160.

Id. at 66-67. The President's Commission noted this process with approval in PRESI-

DENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2.

161. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1982).
162. Handler, Dependent People, supra note 18, at 68.
163. Id. at 69-70. Contrast this description with an analysis of the implementation of the
formal due process mechanisms specified by the legislation. Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff, Legal Reform of Special Education: EmpiricalStudies and ProceduralProposals,62 CALIF. L. REV. 40

(1974) (suggesting that the due process hearing neither empowers the participants nor equalizes power relationships, as the Act intended).
164. J. HANDLER, supra note 4, at 73-75.
165. Id. at 71 (describing the negotiating relationship in the "dialogic community").
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determination and best interests continue to play a role, but as different
aspects of the negotiative strategy.
But there are weaknesses inherent in this model. First, as Handler
notes, the examples cannot be generalized; each involves agencies with
professional norms of care, respect, and nurturing. 166 While the relationships require people to interact with one another, there is an underlying paternalism inherent in the norms of the professions (medicine,
social work, teaching) that will not be easily overcome.
Handler suggests a system of concrete incentives, drawn from bargaining theory, that would encourage the "naturally" paternalistic professional to treat the client as an autonomous individual. 167 Concrete
incentives would not materialize without underlying humane values; if
understanding or cooperation is absent, there will be no reciprocity. Possible incentives include financial assistance that would enable a dependent person to exercise some control over the environment, favorable
regulatory protections, or collective support to enhance bargaining
power. For the most part, these are power resources that give dependent
1 68
persons a medium of exchange.
What is valuable about Handler's analysis is that it focuses not so
much on the process of decision-making itself, but on the relationships
that underlie the decision-making process. In this manner, it addresses
the nature of the conflict between rights, in the liberal-individual
rights-view, and the social or moral obligations of society through government-the communitarian perspective of rights. It therefore allows a
closer examination of the purposes behind an ideology that relies on an
exercise of self-determination and that incorporates pluralism as a moral
166. Id.
167. Katz suggests that autonomy is a central component of self-determination, noting
that autonomy refers to the capacity of individuals to exercise their right of self-determination,
with free choice as the external component, as more sensitive to intersecting or competing
rights analyses. J. KATZ, supra note 60, at 105. Some commentators have, like Walzer, seen
the issue as a process of balancing rights in many spheres; others as a process of re-defining
them. See M. WALZER, supra note 94, at 6-10; Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Lynd, Community Rights, 62 TEX. L. REv 1417, 1418 (1984). Feminists have often seen the process as one of providing context or "caring" to the enterprise. See
C. GILLIGAN, supra note 41, at 17; MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State:
Toward Feminist Jurisprudence,8 SIGNS: J. WOMEN, CULTURE & Soc'y. 635, 644-45 (1983);
Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectivesfrom the Women's Movement, 61
N.Y.U. L. REv. 589, 614 (1986). Many commentators, however, have urged that the rights
thesis not be abandoned, particularly for the disadvantaged. See Sparer, FundamentalHuman
Rights, Legal Entitlements and the Societal Struggle: A Friendly Critiqueof the CriticalLegal
Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REv. 509, 573-74 (1984).
168. See, e.g., P. FRIERE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (M. Ramos, trans. 1985); Y.
HASENFELD, HUMAN SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS (1983).
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value. This construction, however, may underestimate the absolute
powerlessness of many elderly or disabled persons. In order to exercise
power and power resources, there must be an ability to act. If removal of
life-prolonging technology is taken as a metaphor for this powerlessness,
both the "humane values" and the "concrete incentives" need to be constructed artificially, either by imposing a set of values or by reconstructing a formerly competent individual's free will. In such an artificial
construction, the "reciprocal concrete incentives" that should underlie
professional discretion in the social welfare area are minimal. For this
reason, despite the continued appeal of this characterization, as long as
social welfare decisions are governed by broad discretion, it may be necessary to retain the ideology of due process as a guiding structure.
IV.
A.

Conclusion: The Demystification of Best Interests and
Social Autonomy

Judicial Standards and Alternative Solutions

As the series of cases from the New Jersey Supreme Court suggests,
unresolved issues have made existing judicial standards difficult to apply
and less than satisfactory. More judicial intervention is likely to occur,
whether or not relevant legislation is passed. The uncertain validity of
the rights model for making decisions involving nonautonomous persons
provides the unifying theme between the five cases examined in this
Commentary. The opinions, moving back and forth between the poles of
"self-determination" and "best interests" doctrine, and between procedural safeguards and more flexible decision-making norms of professional discretion, come to an uneasy resolution. The alternatives
suggested by the court--continued judicial supervision accompanied by
legislative activity, protective mechanisms such as ombudsmen and ethics committees, and greater family and community involvement-are
variations on the theme that individual rights to self-determination are
best preserved through flexible application of the best interests doctrine.
As the New Jersey Supreme Court discovered, this is only a partial solution. The alternative approaches share another theme: that the rights
formulation underlying much decision-making, especially with regard to
nonautonomous persons, can no longer be considered an exclusive and
superior structure for making decisions. A reformulation of that structure should address the interrelated issues of power, class, and community in a context that addresses the relationship of community values to
ideals of self-determination.
Most discourse about right to treatment sees the decision-making
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process as a paradigm of individual self-determination, through the right
to privacy and a formulation of free choice. Callahan, Emanuel, and
Handler all propose to resolve the issues through different versions of a
communitarian ideology, grounded in ideological consensus (Callahan),
majoritarian principles (Emanuel), or the exercise of discretion based
upon negotiation of principles (Handler). They are concerned with the
conflict between the individualistic paradigm of justice and the communitarian paradigm of care. Again and again we return, in the judicial opinions and in the proposed models, to the same conflicts: individual rights
and community values, procedural'mandates and professional discretion,
conflicting professional cultures. The doctrines of best interests and selfdetermination are not monolithic, however; they are clusters of values
associated with making decisions-autonomy, informed consent, freedom of choice, and personal privacy. For nonautonomous people-the
elderly, poor, or disabled-the character of autonomy is altered by the
impossibility of achieving anything more than an approximation of selfdetermination.1 69 For this reason, both communitarian and pluralistic
paradigms hold promise, but only if they incorporate the claims of the
marginal populations within the community.
B. Incorporation of Communitarian Values in Decision-Making Structures
(1) Self-Determination
In designing decision-making mechanisms for withdrawal of treatment cases, communal values should shape the procedures. The values
inherent in self-determination, however, should also be preserved. As a
true social consensus is increasingly rare in our pluralistic society, the
legal model offers a possible solution, but only if family, community, and
professionals are all truly part of the decision-making process. But that
model carries the danger of excluding the community, in favor of procedure, as we saw in Conroy. When true self-determination is not possible,
the communitarian role might be effected not by an individual legal process approach, but through communitarian alternatives, such as hospitalor community-based ethics committees. The need to balance individual
and community interests compels rethinking the options in a broader societal context, with the preservation of individual autonomy as a central
goal.
In the decisions discussed in this Commentary, self-determination is
grounded in both a constitutional right to privacy and in a common-law
169.

See Weinberg, supra note 2, at 531-32.
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concept of an individual's right to choose. 170 The standard that emerges
relies heavily on a best interests model of community values and professional-client interaction. In a pluralistic society, however, the meaning
of "best interests" is not the same for everyone; it bears little resemblance
to the doctrine's origins in a shared value system in which one individual
might truly know what was best for another. 17 1 How procedurally, is
this to be done, where no single set of values exists? Whose view of "best
interests" is to be controlling?
The Farrell-Peter-Jobestrilogy illustrates how easy it is to blur the
distinction between subjective and objective criteria. When a person
clearly seems to be suffering, at least from the perspective of "others,"
objective factors such as the nature of the medical testimony or the character of a person's prior statements might alter the nature of a decision
that is purportedly based upon self-determination. If this occurs, what
appears to be an objective self-determination standard is indistinguishable from a traditional best interests standard. In many respects, the law
in New Jersey after the trilogy is the same as it was prior to Quinlan.172
At heart, the new test has again become the traditional best interests test.
(2) Best Interests
The cases suggest that the inconsistent application of the best interests standard raises concerns about its use as a dominant standard for
making decisions about nonautonomous persons. While the rationale in
some of the cases indicates that self-determination might be protected
within a best interests framework, a close reading of the trilogy indicates
that this is unlikely. Ideas about what "best interests" really means are
not fixed; they are dependent both on the norms of society (or of the
court) and upon individual features of a decision-maker's personality and
values. The standard assumes a social consensus that is presently nonexistent. The best interests standard does not accommodate objective procedural implementation adequately, unless self-determination is
incorporated sufficiently. The five cases decided by the court suggest that
this is very difficult to do. It is even more problematic when subjective
self-determination is not possible, when an individual has no history of
competence, or is a minor, or has no identifiable community ties.
170. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
171. See the rationale given for the decisions in Farrell,and Jobes-that third party decisions are to be based on a person's best interests, considering from an external stance the
"needs, risks and benefits to the affected person." In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 427, 529 A.2d
434, 451 (1987).
172. Annas, In Thunder, Lightning or Rain: What Three Doctors Can Do, 17 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 28 (1987).
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In the Farrell-Peter-Jobestrilogy, the court stressed the interconnected roles of family, community, and health-care professionals. The
safeguards the court suggested for protecting an individual's self-determination-legislative enactments, ethics or prognosis committees, or
ombudsmen-are neither universal, nor have they yet been proven effective. It is not clear that they will be any more successful than a court in
preserving self-determination for dependent people, especially the elderly
and frail. When self-determination is not possible, both communitarian
values and those of pluralism should be moderated by the ideology of
self-determination to afford individuals adequate protection.
(3) PluralisticSelf-Determination: Restructuring Best Interests
The purpose of this Commentary is to examine and raise questions
about the way in which the competing standards of best interests and
self-determination have merged in the context of interactions between
nonautonomous people and their caretakers. Characteristics of these interactions make effective implementation of individual rights for nonautonomous persons difficult. Accordingly, this inquiry addresses the
conflicts that arise when courts attempt to balance self-determination,
grounded in the ideology of privacy and individual rights, with the methodology of a best interests standard.
The formulation of an ideology that would preserve the values inherent in self-determination should be explored. Joel Handler has attempted to accomplish this, in part, through his characterization of
social autonomy and reciprocal concrete incentives. Yet, his solution relies heavily on some form of benevolent exercise of discretion by the person who has the power in the relationship, and upon society's willingness
to create concrete incentives for its marginal members. Handler is correct, however, in observing that the nature of the social welfare relationship imposes a particularly difficult set of concerns.
The analysis raises several concerns about the nature of the bureaucratic provider-recipient relationship. First, procedures mandated by
courts-even those that express the individual rights ideology-must be
superimposed upon existing bureaucratic structures, within hospitals,
nursing homes, and social service agencies, each of which has its own
internal rules, values, and codes of behavior. Second, interaction within
social service settings often follows a medical model-hierarchical in impact, and designed only to cure rather than to educate. The current critique of the medical model, especially within social service professions,
suggests that the language of diagnosis, treatment, and cure, imposed by
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professionals upon nonprofessionals, should be replaced by a cooperative,
173
interdisciplinary perspective.
Third, these structures are superimposed on an additional structure,
that of professionalization and credentialization, and conflict among professions as they cross one another's boundaries. Much of the apparent
disagreement in the five New Jersey cases arose from an attempt to impose legal culture on medical ideology. Finally, none of the balancing
approaches that have been suggested seems to allow care providers to
accommodate the needs of service recipients to maintain autonomy in
some, if not in all, respects. The game, too often, is all or nothing.
The New Jersey Supreme Court created a framework in which the
issues can be discussed and provided opportunities for a dialogue that
previously did not exist. The court, however, has also underscored the
limitations of its own decisions. The use of balancing tests to mediate the
self-determination versus best interests dilemma illustrates one limitation. A system of balancing runs the risk either of overly complicating
procedure without adding substantive content, or of recreating a broad
74
discretionary system under another name.
Are there areas in which approaches incorporating these ideas are
being explored? Hospital- or nursing home-based ethics committees and
Ombudsman systems are important developments, that need further
analysis. Many hospitals have created ethics committees in the years following Quinlan; however, their functions and methodologies have not
been adequately assessed. 175 Their potential as quasi-administrative
structures that would exercise decision-making as well as implementation
authority needs to be further explored. But there are limitations in how
they are conceptualized. Most of these committees, as presently constituted, rely heavily on a multidisciplinary approach to professional interaction and thus are less likely to involve the individual whose autonomy
is at risk.
173.

Weinberg, Autonomy as a Different Voice: Women, Disabilitiesand Decisionmaking,

in BEYOND
see also N.

PEDESTALS: WOMEN WITH DISABILITIES 290-91 (M.
CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING

Fine & A. Asch eds. 1988);
167 (1978), C. GILLIGAN,

supra note 41, at 159-60; Burt, ConstitutionalLaw and the Teaching of Parables,93 YALE L.J.
455 (1984).
174. Capron, Borrowed Lessons: The Role of Ethical Distinctionsin FramingLaw on LifeSustaining Treatment, ARIZ. ST. L.J. 647, 658-60 (1984).
175. For one of the few examples of such an examination, see Merritt, supra note 82. See

also Imperiled Newborns, HASTINGS CENTER REP. Special Project 5; H. KUHSE & H. SINGER,
SHOULD THE BABY LIVE? (1985). There is beginning to be a body of commentary and analysis of ethics committees and their role in the medical process. See 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP.
(1988) for a discussion of the ethics committee networks that have grown up around the country. See also sources cited supra note 82.
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The procedural mechanisms used to balance self-determination and
best interest will be crucial to implementation of these decisions. The
New Jersey Supreme Court contributed to the examination of the problem from a judicial perspective. The next step should be to search for an
approach that allows this examination to continue within a broader societal context, and within the institutions responsible for implementation
of the policies.
In conclusion, while the answers remain elusive, there is an outline
of areas for further inquiry. The procedural structure of Conroy seems
too rigid; the "compromise position" of Jobes is not sufficiently clear; and
the communitarian formulations suggested by Callahan, Emanuel, and
Handler seem too discretionary. The conceptualization of a system of
negotiated interaction that relies on balancing reciprocal incentives, may
be a way to build into a quasi-administrative system, reciprocal incentives that have relevance for persons who cannot act for themselves. A
mandate that "community representatives" participate in these committees might be a start. The present construct of self-determination, however, shackled as it is by a best interests analysis that presupposes a preexisting communal relationship, is probably insufficient to protect the
marginal individuals who are most in need of protection.
Whatever structure is adopted, several issues will remain particularly troubling. What values underlie a pluralistic ideology? Who
should make decisions about individual cases? How does a decisionmaker distinguish between objective and subjective criteria, and between
medical and legal conclusions? How is the value of life affected by diminution of physical or cognitive functioning? What is the analytical
framework of the value system to be applied in making a decision, and of
the framework for implementation? Finally, what is the impact of pluralism on the concept of self-determination? Although the New Jersey
Supreme Court has further defined the context in which such questions
are asked, the questions themselves have yet to be answered.

